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SAFE PAYMENTS REVIEW 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AIRC   - Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
ARTF  - Australian Road Transport Federation 
ARTIO  - Australian Road Transport Industrial Organisation 
ATA  - Australian Trucking Association 
ATC  - Australian Transport Council 
CCI WA - Chamber of Commerce, Western Australia 
COR  - Chain of Responsibility 
DHFM  - Driving Hours and Fatigue Management 
GHQ  - General Health Questionnaire (a measure of health/wellbeing) 
IRC  - Industrial Relations Commission 
KPI   - key performance indicator 
NTC  - National Transport Commission 
OHS  - occupational health and safety 
OHSMS - occupational health and safety management systems 
QTA  - Queensland Trucking Association 
RTA  - Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) 
RTBU  - Rail, Tram and Bus Union 
SCOT  - Standing Committee on Transport 
TFCA  - Tasmanian Forestry Contractors Association 
TWU  - Transport Workers Union  
VTA  - Victorian Transport Association 
WST  - Workplace Standards Tasmania 
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BACKGROUND TO REVIEW  
 
On Friday 25 July 2008 a Joint Media Statement was issued by the Honourable Julia 
Gillard, Deputy Prime Minister and Minster for Employment and Workplace 
Relations, the Honourable Anthony Albanese, Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, 
Regional Development and Local Government and the Honourable Craig Emerson, 
Minister for Small Business, Independent Contractors and the Service Economy.  The 
Joint Media Statement was entitled “Safer Payment Systems for Heavy Vehicle 
Drivers”. 
 
The Joint Media Statement commenced as follows: 
 “The National Transport Commission (NTC) will investigate and report on 
driver remuneration and payment methods in the Australian trucking industry 
and make recommendations for reform. 
 
 The NTC will be assisted by Professor Michael Quinlan of UNSW and the Hon 
Lance Wright QC, the former president of the NSW Industrial Relations 
Commission.” 
 
The Joint Media Statement is included in its entirety at Appendix 1. 
 
In our subsequent meetings with officers of the National Transport Commission 
(NTC) we were advised that the assistance required of us would be in the form of a 
report as to the terms of reference of the Inquiry.  This report thus provides the 
assistance sought from us. 
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TERMS OF REFERENCE – SAFE PAYMENTS  
 
The Terms of Reference for this Inquiry, as subsequently provided to us, were in the 
following terms: 
 
 
To identify the means by which commonwealth legislative systems applying (or to 
apply) to employees and independent contractors could/should accommodate a system 
of ‘safe payments’ for employees and owner-drivers.  
 
In considering the above, have regard to the following: 
  
1. the link between driver remuneration and payment methods (and related 
matters such as waiting times and unpaid work) and safety outcomes; 
 
2. the scope of existing regulatory models for employees and owner-drivers in 
the transport industry including existing definitions of independent 
contractor/owner-driver; 
 
3. current capacity and mechanisms to recover costs, such as fuel costs and other 
variable costs;  
 
4. the role and impact of all parties in the transport supply chain on driver 
payment methods and remuneration;  
 
5. the concurrent use of employees and owner-drivers in the transport industry 
including consideration of existing regulatory models in other jurisdictions 
with the capacity to deal concurrently with both employee and owner-driver 
payment methods and remuneration; and  
 
6. any gaps in the current regulatory approach. 
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STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS  
  
In undertaking this review the National Transport Commission undertook the 
following activities to hear the views and opinions of stakeholders:  
• put out a request for submissions via the NTC website; and   
• engaged in a round of one on one consultations in Brisbane (Friday 19 
September 2008), Sydney (Friday 26 September 2008) and Melbourne 
(Tuesday 30 September 2008).  
 
Written submissions  
On 5 August 2008 the NTC put out a request for submissions into the ‘safe payments’ 
review.  The request for submissions asked parties to address the following questions:  
1. What systems are currently in place to recover genuine increases in heavy vehicle 
operating costs (eg: fuel levies) and are they effective? Is the industry able to 
negotiate fair cost recovery?  
 
2. Is there evidence of a link between driver payment methods (eg: kilometre rates), 
remuneration, and safety outcomes in the road freight industry?  
 
3. Is there a role for government to intervene in payment systems for transport 
operators?  
 
4. If regulatory intervention is required, what form should this take? Should that role 
approach different for employed or contracted drivers? Could there be any 
unintended effects from implementing safe rates?  
 
5. Do you have any other comments on ‘safe payments’ for heavy vehicle drivers?  
 
The NTC’s mailing list goes out to around 5700 email addresses which include 
industry, drivers, industry associations and government addresses.  In addition to that, 
the NTC directly contacted parties including large and medium operators, groups 
purporting to represent independent contractors, and others associations.  Many of 
those parties either declined, or failed to provide submissions.  
 
The NTC received the following written submissions:  
 
1. Mr H Morris Australian Logistics Council  
2. Mr T Squires Tothag Transport Group 
3. Mr J Redfern Coles 
4. Mr T Sheldon TWU 
5. Ms J Lewis ATA NSW 
6. Mr D Coonan ATA  
7. Mr T Lovelle CCI 
8. Mr P Garske QTA 
9. Mr P Lovel VTA  
10. Mr P Lovel ARTIO  
11. Mr A Thomas RTBU) 
12. Professor Ann Williamson   
13. Mr P Schuback  
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14. Mr F Kroon Tasmanian Forest Contractors Association 
15. Mr Frank Black 
16. Mr J Brown Sarre  
17. Mr Freestone 
18. Betts Transport  
19. Ms Petrovic  
20. Mr Lucas  
21. Mr E Willemse Woolworths (confidential)  
22. Mr P Hennekam WorkSafe Victoria (confidential)  
23. SafeWork South Australia 
24. NSW Government 
 
All submissions which were not requested to be confidential were uploaded onto the 
NTC website.  
 
Stakeholder consultations  
 
The NTC, in conjunction with the two expert consultants undertook a round of 
meetings with stakeholders.  The following parties appeared:  
 
1. Zoe Wilson, Australian Logistics Council 
2. Ian Ross,  Australian Logistics Council 
3. Wally Eaglesham, Rocky’s Own Transport 
4. Ren Van Duren, Rocky’s Own Transport   
5. Tony Sheldon, NSW and National Secretary Transport Workers Union     
6. Michael Kaine, National Assistant Secretary Transport Workers Union    
7. Hughie Williams, State Secretary QLD Transport Workers Union    
8. Karen Bow, Industrial Officer QLD Transport Worker Union    
9. Scott Connolly, Executive Officer QLD Transport Workers Union    
10. John Berger, Senior Organiser Vic / Tas Transport Workers Union    
11. Naomi Rowe, National Campaign Co-ordinator Transport Workers Union    
12. Chris Fennell, National Organiser Transport Workers Union    
13. Paul Walsh, Owner Driver  
14. Paul Dewberry, Owner Driver  
15. Ian Vaughan, Employee Driver  
16. Norm Hill, Employee Driver  
17. Ian Buckingham, Employee Driver  
18. Brad Webster, Employee Driver  
19. Cliff Curran, Ex- Owner Driver  
20. Kevin Hoey, Employee Driver  
21. Luke Jeffries, Employee Driver 
22. Frank Black, Owner-Driver representative Australian Trucking Association  
23. Ray and Dale Jordan  
24. Rob Fittler  
25. Keith Beanie  
26. Mark Bowland  
27. Diane Nicholls 
28. Robin Casey 
29. Eric Willemse, Secondary Freight Manager Woolworths 
30. Nathalie Samia, Group Manager Government Relations, Woolworths   
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31. Professor Ann Williamson, University of New South Wales   
32. Peter Davis 
33. Jim Redfern, General Manager Supply Chain, Coles   
34. Chris Mara, Adviser Government Affairs, Coles  
35. Paul Ryan, Victorian Trucking Association & Australian Road Transport 
Industrial Organisation  
36. Phil Lovel, Victorian Trucking Association & Australian Road Transport 
Industrial Organisation  
37. Peter Garske, Queensland Trucking Association & Australian Road Transport 
Industrial Organisation  
38. David Coonan, National Manager Policy, Australian Trucking Association    
39. Steve Shearer,  Chair, Safety KRA, Australian Trucking Association (Chief 
Executive South Australian Road Transport Association)     
40. Kathy Williams, Member, ATA Council, Deputy Chair, ATA Transport 
Policy & Economics Committee, Bunker Freight Lines   
41. Bernie Belacic, CEO, NatRoad 
42. Brian Hicks, Brian Hicks Transport   
43. Michael Kennedy 
44. WorkSafe Victoria – Paul Hennekam  
45. Paul Toogood 
46. Daniel Madden 
47. Ray Brackt 
48. Bill Schuit 
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THE IMPORTANCE OF SAFETY IN THE HEAVY VEHICLE INDUSTRY 
 
1) While the purpose of this Review is not report on the hazards associated with 
heavy vehicle road transport some brief observations do establish a necessary 
context for evidence being reviewed in relation to remuneration and safety. 
Measured in terms of the overall number of injuries and fatalities as well as the 
incidence per 1000 employees, road transport ranks as a very dangerous 
occupation. In Australasia, North America and the European Union the road 
transport industry accounts for the highest number of work-related fatalities in any 
given year and the occupation of truck driver usually ranks in the top six most 
dangerous occupations. In Australia there has been no significant shift in the 
annual number of fatalities resulting from crashes involving articulated trucks 
between the early 1990s and 2007 despite an overall decline in the annual road toll 
(Department of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development, 2007, 2008). 
While it is difficult to make comparisons across countries available data for the 
late 1990s on heavy truck crash-related fatalities per 100 million kilometers 
traveled indicate that Australia’s record was significant worse than that of both the 
USA and UK   (Quinlan et al, 2006). Fatalities and serious injuries represent only 
the tip of the ice-berg of OHS problems in the industry (Quinlan and Mayhew, 
2006; oral submission of WorkSafe Victoria) 
 
Table 1: Fatalities involving articulated trucks in NSW and Australia, 1990-1999 
 
Year Artic drivers killed Other road users killed1 Total killed 
 NSW Aust2 NSW Aust2 NSW Aust2 
1990 18 46 76 216 94 263 
1991 13 30 65 153 78 183 
1992 18 40 66 141 84 181 
1993 21 42 48 143 69 204 
1994 9 27 58 140 67 179 
1995 10 31 53 168 63 199 
1996 13 33 43 160 56 194 
1997 15 36 56 135 71 171 
1998 23 N/A 48 N/A 71 179 
1999 13 N/A 51 N/A 64 189 
 
1. In crashes involving at least one articulated truck 
2. Source for Australian data: Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Transport Safety Statistics Unit. Supplied by 
RTA. 
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2) The risks associated with trucking extend well beyond truck drivers to other road 
users. As Table 1 indicates a substantial number of persons killed in crashes 
involving articulated trucks are other road users. In New South Wales the Roads 
and Traffic Authority (RTA) estimated that in the years 1993 to 1998 fatigued 
heavy truck drivers accounted for 80.8 casualty crashes (or 7.6% of total casualty 
crashes) and fatigued articulated truck drivers accounted for 58.7 (or 5.6%) 
casualty crashes.  Figures for 1999 indicate that of 1595 persons killed or injured 
on NSW roads in heavy truck crashes, truck driver speeding contributed to 170 
casualties, driver fatigue to 98 casualties and insecure loads to 25 casualties. Of 
the 830 persons killed or injured in crashes involving articulated trucks, truck 
driver speeding contributed to 130 casualties, driver fatigue to 70 and insecure 
loads to 15 deaths or injuries. Ignoring single-vehicle incidents, truck drivers were 
deemed at fault in roughly one quarter of crashes, Australia-wide for the years 
1990-1996. Truck driver fault exceeded 90% in single-vehicle incidents (a 
significant number were fatigue-related). 
 
3) In 1999, 189 Australians died in crashes involving articulated trucks (or about one 
tenth of all road fatalities that year) and more recent data indicates that this 
situation has not changed. In the latest year for which data is available (2007), 
1616 Australians died in road crashes (18 more than 2006), with articulated trucks 
accounting for about 10% of fatal crashes. For the year 2007 a total of 235 persons 
died in incidents involving articulated and heavy rigid trucks. A far larger number 
suffered serious injury. According to the Transport Workers Union submission (at 
page 1) drawing on Bureau of Transport Economics data each road death costs 
$1.7 million and each injury incident $408,000 expressed in terms of 1996 dollars 
(meaning the current figure would be higher). Beyond the immediate economic 
costs road deaths and serious injury associated with heavy vehicles there are 
critical social and human costs. These include loss of or incapacity to a 
breadwinner or parent, financial strain and disruption to families (including 
education of children and social activities) as well as the emotional cost and 
grieving experienced by family members, friends and work colleagues. These 
costs extend to drivers, other road users, and the community more generally 
(including those in the emergency services that must deal with these incidents). 
 
4) In sum, the safety of heavy vehicle road transport remains both a serious concern 
in relation to both drivers and the community more generally. Although some 
material relevant to other sectors of the industry was made available to the 
Review, the bulk of the material related to heavy vehicles, especially those 
engaged in the long haul sector; and this is reflected in our report. At the same 
time, it should be noted that this is the sector of the industry where there is most 
concern about safety. 
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REMUNERATION, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND SAFETY 
 
The link between driver remuneration and payment methods (and related 
matters such as waiting times and unpaid work) and safety outcomes; current 
capacity and mechanisms to recover costs, such as fuel costs and other variable 
costs; the role and impact of all parties in the transport supply chain on driver 
payments and methods; the concurrent use of employees and owner-drivers in 
the transport industry; and gaps in current regulatory approaches 
 
5) A key term of reference for this inquiry was to investigate the link, if any, 
between driver remuneration and payment methods (and related matters such as 
waiting times and unpaid work) and safety outcomes. In practice, this cannot be 
neatly disentangled from other terms of reference, including capacity/mechanisms 
to recover costs; the concurrent use of employees and owner/drivers; the role and 
impact of all parties in the transport supply chain on driver payments and 
methods; and gaps in current regulatory approaches. As this report will show, the 
factors just identified all intersect to impact on the relationship between 
remuneration and safety. For example, the capacity to recover costs for genuine 
increases in operating costs can be seen as one aspect of the capacity of 
owner/operators or small firms to secure rates that will sustain the business and 
this, in turn, can be influenced by both the power exercised by clients and the 
operator’s place in an often multi-tiered supply chain. In a number of areas these 
issues have been dealt with extensively in earlier reports into the industry and for 
that reason this evidence will be summarized, with the focus being on information 
that is most salient with regard to the current review as well as new information 
submitted to this Review. 
 
6) The term remuneration is important because drivers of heavy vehicles consist of 
both self-employed workers (owner/drivers) and employees. Essentially, 
owner/drivers and employed drivers undertake the same tasks and often compete 
for the same jobs. For owner/drivers the rate they charge a client (whether that is a 
customer, forwarding agent or another truck operator) represents both a freight 
rate to undertake/sustain their business and the basis for their remuneration. A 
range of other commercial practices, including the extensive use of multi-tiered 
subcontracting and waiting time to load/unload and unpaid work also impact the 
remuneration of both owner/drivers and employed drivers. For example, large 
transport operators frequently subcontract their work to smaller firms who in turn 
may subcontract the freight to an even smaller firm or owner/drive. At each 
subcontracting point, the price for the task is reduced in order to provide a return 
to those higher in the chain. The imbalance in two-way freight movements 
between major destinations (such as Melbourne/Brisbane and Melbourne/Perth) 
can also result in differential rates and the practice of backloading (where a return 
trip is undertaken at a highly discounted price). Finally, it needs to be noted that 
the vast majority of heavy vehicle drivers used in the commercial freight industry 
– whether they be owner/drivers or employees – are paid under an 
piecework/incentive or trip-based payment system (calculated as either a total 
price (or per tonne) for a particular task or in terms of a rate per kilometer 
travelled. In short, the payment of drivers intersects with a range of other 
commercial practices in the industry. For this reason, the link between payment 
and safety must be considered in the context of these other practices. 
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7) In the course of the Review 24 written submissions were received from a range of 
parties including transport customers, transport associations, trucking operators, 
government OHS agencies, owner/drivers, employed drivers and unions. The 
Review also spoke to 48 individuals from the same spectrum of interest groups in 
meetings held in Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney. With regard to the question of 
the link between payment and safety a range of views were expressed. Employee 
and owner drivers, the Transport Workers Union, the Rail, Tram and Bus 
Industrial Union, some transport operators, a leading academic researcher, and 
government agencies (such as SafeWork South Australia) all indicated that they 
believed that there was a significant link between driver remuneration and safety. 
The Australian Logistics Council, though recognizing divergent views within its 
membership, did not question the need for ‘safe rates’. One transport association 
(NatRoads) accepted that pay and safety could be linked but argued that it was 
more effective for intervention to focus on fatigue management. Two major users 
of road freight questioned whether there was a link between pay and safety as did 
the Australian Trucking Association. Overall, the vast majority of those making 
submissions to this Review believed remuneration/pay rates had a significant 
effect on safety in the industry. 
 
Prior evidence linking commercial practices, rewards and safety outcomes in 
trucking 
 
8) Before examining specific arguments/evidence to raised support these divergent 
contentions it is worth considering the available evidence pertaining to this 
question. Much of this research was addressed in an earlier report into safety in 
the long haul trucking industry (Quinlan, 2001) but is worth summarizing along 
with updated evidence. 
 
9) Findings that commercial practices and remuneration schemes are linked to safety 
are not new. During the 1980s and 1990s a number of inquiries, coronial inquests 
and commissioned/non-commissioned research into the road freight industry in 
Australia identified a strong association between commercial practices and safety. 
This included detailed research by Hensher and colleagues during the 1990s 
(Hensher and Battellino, 1990; and Golob, T. and Hensher, 1994) that found a 
clear and significant link between scheduling pressures, unpaid waiting time, 
insecure rewards and access to work, and hazardous practices such as speeding, 
excessive hours and drug use by drivers.  
 
10) Hensher and Battellino (1990:545-546) noted a decline in freight rates over the 
previous decade and the intense level of competition on the large 
Sydney/Melbourne corridor (with its 10-12 hour trip times and emphasis on 
overnight delivery). They also referred to problems of low ‘backloading’ rates on 
longer routes to destinations (Perth, Adelaide and Brisbane) with a pronounced 
imbalance in terms of two-way freight movement. Whereas Linklater’s late 1970s 
studies had reported drivers earned high income-levels relative to their education, 
Hensher and Battellino (1990:546) found this had not been sustained into the late 
1980s, especially given the exceptionally long hours worked, with owner/drivers 
earning much lower incomes than employee drivers. They found that drivers were 
paid according to a diverse array of systems, ranging from fixed wages (22.6%) 
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through to a percentage of the earnings of the truck (19.4%) or a set trip rate 
(25.8%). Examining the issue of average trip speed, Hensher and Battellino 
(1990:551-552) identified five significant variables. For employee drivers, higher 
average speed was associated with drug-use (drug-using drivers drove faster), 
payment system (drivers paid on a trip rate basis drove an average 15 kmh faster 
than those on fixed rates) and vehicle registration (vehicles registered in NSW 
travelled an average 15kmh slower than federal-registered trucks). For 
owner/drivers, increased average trip speed was positively associated with drug 
use, trip time/scheduling (those arriving before 10am had higher speeds), time 
spent waiting for a load prior to departure (those waiting had higher speeds) and 
length of trip (longer trips were associated with higher speeds). In concluding, 
Hensher and Battellino stated they had “…confirmed our initial hypothesis that 
the underlying economic conditions in the industry are a significant contributor to 
the on-road behaviour of drivers. These conditions, which manifest themselves in 
declining freight rates, tightening schedules and increasing competition confront 
drivers daily as they try to forge a living on the road. If the problem of safety on 
our roads is to be addressed, and solved satisfactorily, it is important to look 
beyond the symptoms of speeding, infringement of driving time regulations, and 
driver fatigue and consider the underlying causes which result in this behaviour” 
(Hensher and Battellino, 1990:553). 
 
11) Following this pilot study the Federal Office of Road safety funded a more 
extensive survey of 820 drivers (Hensher et al 1991). As with the earlier pilot 
survey, Hensher et al (1991:101) found that drivers spent considerable time (an 
average of 3.5 hours) on off-road activities (loading/unloading, maintenance etc) 
before commencing a trip. When they sampled particular trips Hensher et al found 
that 35% of drivers were travelling to a set schedule but 60% of drivers reported 
that even where freight forwarders hadn’t set a schedule a self-imposed arrival 
time was set, primarily due to concerns about queuing and getting the next load.  
Of those drivers on a set schedule, a small proportion was offered incentives 
(2.7%) but a quarter indicated they would be penalised for late arrival (Hensher et 
al, 1991:48). Around half of all drivers felt freight companies demanded 
unreasonably tight schedules (the figure was slightly lower for large fleet drivers 
Hensher et al, 1991:51). Average trip speed was highest amongst small fleet 
drivers (82.01 kph) and younger drivers aged 17-24 years (84.72 kph) compared 
to an overall average of 81.06 kph. Econometric analysis indicated that for both 
owner/drivers and employers of drivers, economic rewards were a major influence 
on the propensity to speed. Hensher et al (1991:96) concluded: “There is very 
strong evidence to support the primary hypothesis that the trip rate received by 
the owner driver (ie gross earnings) and the freight rate obtained by the company 
using an employee driver have a significant influence on the propensity to speed. 
The negative relationship is stronger for owner drivers as might be expected…The 
main impetus of this study has been confirmed: on-road performance is strongly 
linked to economic reward.” The study drew particular attention to trip-based 
payment: ““It is the rate per se which acts to stimulate road practices in various 
forms in order that an acceptable level of total earnings (net of truck related 
expenses) is obtained. Any deviation from a fixed salary tends to encourage 
practices designed to increase economic reward which are not synergetic with 
reducing exposure to risk” (Hensher et al, 1991:102). 
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12) As part of their study, Hensher et al (1991:28-29) had also considered the 
insecurity of owner/drivers without contracts or regular load arrangements and the 
problem of backloading (involving heavily discounted freight rates) where two-
way freight movement imbalances made return loads scarce. Over 40% of drivers 
had rejected a load in the past 12 months the most common reason was that the 
rate was too low, with other reasons being the unreliability of payment by the 
customer (7.4%). Only a small number of loads were rejected on the basis of 
being overweight (4.5%) or that it would require exceeding legal driving limits 
(2.7% Hensher et al, 1991:30). The combination of competition, low freight rates 
and uncertainty of loads and consequent uncertainty of earnings had other safety-
related effects, most notably that it encouraged “…the practice of the self-imposed 
schedules and the taking of stimulants to enable extension of the productive 
working week. While the extended working week does increase the earnings, the 
incidence of productive (ie driving) time decreases as total working hours 
increases. Any strategy which can reduce the uncertainty of earnings must reduce 
the hours of total work, increase the amount of sleep time and consequently 
reduce the incidence of self-imposed schedules and hence the use of stimulants”  
(Hensher et al, 1991:102). 
 
13) In a later paper based on survey results for 402 drivers, Golob and Hensher 
queried the drawing of a simple dichotomy between owner/drivers and employee 
drivers. (1994:29). They argued that small company drivers had some of the worst 
practices in terms of speeding, drug-use and traffic fines and that a more useful 
explanatory classification was in terms of the nature of contracts, work practices 
and the ability to secure loads. For example, drivers on regular contracts were less 
likely to use drugs or speed (though they attract a higher number of speeding 
fines) which Golob and Hensher saw as having important policy implications, 
along with the earnings issue more generally. Once again it was found that 
earnings exercised a significant influence on on-road behaviour. Thirty seven 
percent of drivers had a schedule imposed by an employer or freight forwarder 
and, these drivers on such trips were more likely to be fined for speeding. For the 
remainder, propensity to self-impose a schedule, and speed/attract fines, was 
associated with the time spent securing a load and final delivery (carrying 
perishable goods and, to a lesser extent, heavier gross truck weight also influenced 
scheduling and other behaviour). Self-imposed schedules were, in turn, the most 
important influence on the propensity to take stimulant drugs. Golob and Hensher 
(1994:25) found the greatest influence on average trip speed was the earning rates 
of both owner/drivers and employee drivers. Drivers with higher earnings rates 
exhibit lower speeds, and this is particularly true for owner/drivers. The last 
finding in particular is important because the clear implication is that improving 
earning rates for owner/drivers would alter the on-road behaviour of owner/drivers 
contrary to the a priori reasoning of a number of other reports (such as Driving 
Forward) which argue drivers would simply continue doing the same practices at 
the higher rate in order to enhance their earnings.  
 
14) In 1995 Arblaster and colleagues completed a report funded by a research grant 
from the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) based 
on interviews with 57 long distance truck drivers based in South Australia, 52 
partners and a small group of managers and ex-drivers. Drivers also filled out a 
time-use diary over a two-week period. Though quite a small survey population, 
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the pattern of results was generally consistent with earlier studies already 
discussed. For example, the study found evidence of unrealistic trip schedules, 
such as a trip time of 24 hours between Adelaide and Perth that translated into an 
average speed of 112 kilometers per hour without breaks (Arblaster et al, 
1995:84).  
 
15) Two large surveys of long haul drivers at the beginning and end of the 1990s 
provided clear evidence on the use of contingent payment systems (especially trip 
based pay) and the connection of this to occupational health and safety. The 
national fatigue survey (n=1007) by Williamson et al (2000) found that most 
drivers (68.3% were paid per trip according to the kilometres’ travelled or the 
weight or volume of freight delivered while 14% were paid a flat load rate). 
Around 17% of drivers negotiated pay rates for each load while 43% of the 
remainder had ongoing contracts for some or all of their loads. In terms of 
payment level, 63.2% of drivers were paid the award rate or better but 17.1% were 
receiving less than the award. A further 19.1% were unaware of how their pay 
compared to the award (previous research would suggest many of these drivers 
would be receiving rates below the award). The survey found there had been 
increase in the work required of long distance drivers, entailing longer trips and 
with a reported earlier onset of fatigue. Most drivers did some midnight to dawn 
driving (when there are far higher risks of crashing), over 20% had exceeded the 
72 hour working hour limit in the last week and around a quarter admitted 
breaking driving hours regulations on every trip. In short, many drivers worked 
excessive and dangerous hours and the situation was, if anything, getting worse.  
Long hours also made it very difficult for drivers to juggle work and family 
commitments. 
 
16) Williamson, Feyer, Friswell and Sadural (2000:35) found drivers under a payment 
by results system were almost twice as likely to report having experienced fatigue 
on at least half of their trips than drivers paid on a time/hourly basis (32.5% as 
compared to 18.7%. The 1991 survey yielded a similar ratio although the overall 
level of reported fatigue was higher). In the context of other evidence, the impact 
of payment systems on fatigue management assumes critical importance in the 
overall conclusions of the Williamson et al study. After dealing with other sources 
of scheduling pressure such as freight forwarder and customer pressure 
Williamson et al (2000:111) state: “The remuneration system is another pressure 
on drivers that appears from the survey, to influence drivers’ work schedules. 
Both surveys reveal that payment by results was the predominant method of 
remuneration for all drivers, even company employees, and this form of payment 
increased markedly across the period of the two surveys… Analysis of the 
relationship between payment type and experience of fatigue demonstrated that 
drivers who were paid in a payment-by-results mode were more likely to report 
fatigue as a substantial or major personal problem and to experience fatigue more 
often than drivers paid under other payment regimes. In addition, a significant 
percentage of drivers volunteered the strategy of standardising or regulating 
minimum payment rates as a way of managing fatigue…The pressures exerted by 
the payment by results system can also be seen in the influences on drivers to 
break the working hours regulations. The factors that distinguish drivers who 
frequently break the working hours regulations from those who do not are related 
to organisation of work such as the need to do enough trips to earn a living and to 
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get in early to get the next load rather than personal reasons. This is further 
evidence that the way drivers are remunerated clearly has an adverse effect on the 
ability to manage fatigue well. This is another factor that should be examined 
further if fatigue management is to be truly achieved in this industry.” 
 
17) Subsequent analysis of the two surveys referred by Williamson found an 
association between payment by results and increasing use of stimulant drugs to 
cope with work demands, with these findings being subsequently published in the 
American Journal of Epidemiology (Williamson, et al, 2004 and Williamson, 
2007). In Table 1 of the latter which summarised drug use Williamson noted that 
in the 1991 survey 12.9% of drivers reported using drugs often, 19.2% stated they 
used drugs sometimes, 12.2% stated they used drugs rarely and 56% stated they 
never used drugs. The corresponding figures on drug use from the 1998 survey 
were 9.1%, 12.3%, 9% and 68.9% (Williamson, 2007: 1322). In discussing her 
results, Williamson (2007: 1323) stated that “the strongest predictors of drug use 
were payment based on the amount of work completed and fatigue reported as a 
major problem…The strong association of payment by results and low pay with 
drug use among Australian long-distance truck drivers is consistent with other 
research suggesting that economic factors are an important influence on health 
and safety in the workplace…When asked the reasons for their non-compliance 
with rules and regulations, stimulant users were more likely than never users to 
cite external pressures such as tight schedules and economic pressures. This 
finding lends support to the external-demands explanation.” Williamson went on 
to note that drug use was more common amongst less experienced drivers, 
something that suggested that like long term shift workers more experienced long 
haul drivers were a survivor population.  
 
18) It should also be noted that Dr Williamson, an expert on both fatigue and transport 
safety with an international reputation was an expert witness in a notable (and 
successful) prosecution following a fatigue-related truck driver death in NSW 
where drugs were also involved. Dr Williamson’s evidence was cited extensively 
in the decision (WorkCover Authority of New South Wales v Hitchcock (2004) 135 
IR 377 and WorkCover Authority of New South Wales v Hitchcock (2005) 139 IR 
439). Like a number of other cases discussed in this Review reference was made 
to the payment structure in the industry (per kilometer) which encouraged 
excessive hours of work. In his judgement, Walton J found that fatigue had 
significantly impaired the ability of the long haul truck driver Mr Derri Haynes to 
drive safely or to respond safely to that fatigue by electing to take appropriate rest 
breaks. It should also be noted that prolonged sleep derivation/fatigue and drug 
use may not only increase the risk of truck crashes but also have long term health 
effects (these connections were discussed in the NSW Trucking Safety Report, 
Quinlan, 2001. For international research making the same points see Saltzman 
and Belzer, 2003, 2007). Hence, the impact of payment systems is not confined to 
the on-road safety of truck drivers and other road users but also the long term 
health and wellbeing of truck drivers irrespective of any involvement in crashes. 
 
19) Similar observations to those found in the research just described can be found in 
a series of government reports. The final report of the National Road Freight 
Industry Inquiry (May et al 1984) was very clear about the bargaining power that 
consigners and shippers exerted over freight forwarders and transport operators in 
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relation to freight rates. Just a few quotes illustrate this point: “Large consignors, 
through their ability to obtain competitive quotes, are able to lower the rates they 
pay by exercising their considerable bargaining power over forwarders (May et 
al, 1984:30). Large shippers may negotiate discounted (or contract) rates well 
below the schedule rate, especially when the individual forwarder is faced with 
actual or potential competition for the business in question” (May et al 1984:32). 
Looking specifically at the relationship between commercial practices and safety 
the Inquiry Report noted that not only was flouting of speed, weight limits and 
other regulations widespread but this was hardly surprising given the commercial 
advantages to do so. It noted that an instance of overloading of one tonne per trip 
might yield $1500 in additional revenue at the risk of only expecting to pay a fine 
or around $250 if the offence was detected (May et al 1984:184). In terms of 
commercial pressures the Report noted a survey of long distance owner/drivers by 
the NSW Freight Transport Industry Council which concluded they were 
“…overloading and speeding in order to get and keep regular work with 
companies. They are working excessively long hours and attempting to cut costs 
on comprehensive and personal insurance and sometimes on vehicle 
maintenance” (WD Scott, 1984 cited in May et al, 1984:184). 
 
20) In its 1989 report, Concerning Alert Drivers and Safe Speeds for Heavy Vehicles, 
the STAYSAFE committee of the NSW parliament pointed to reward and other 
pressures on drivers and argued that operator accountability could only be 
improved if the incitement to misbehave was addressed: “14.1.1 STAYSAFE 
received substantial anecdotal evidence of drivers being rewarded for achieving 
delivery times which necessitated speeding and inadequate rest, and of drivers 
being penalised for failing to achieve such deadline. In some cases, contracts 
threaten penalties if deliveries are late without adequate excuse.14.1.2…Some 
drivers claimed that they were told by owners or freight forwarders “get it there 
by 7.00 am, or don’t bother to come back for more work.” The “just-in-time” 
(JIT) manufacturing strategy was suggested as possibly contributing to this 
problem. STAYSAFE accepts that such practices probably do occur and sees them 
as very difficult to stop…14.1.3 STAYSAFE understands that an exploration is in 
hand within the Roads and Traffic Authority of means of prosecuting 
unscrupulous freight forwarders. STAYSAFE considers that rewards or penalties 
inciting illegal operations should themselves be clearly illegal, and those 
offering such inducements, regardless of driver explanation, should be subject 
to substantial penalties” (emphasis in original, STAYSAFE, 1989). 
 
21) The question of commercial practices, competition and safety was re-visited by a 
federal parliamentary inquiry into fatigue in the transport industry which reported 
in 2000. In its report, the inquiry (House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Communications, Transport and Arts, 2000:93) noted the significant drive 
towards increasing economic efficiency in transport over the past 20 years 
wrought by a number of factors. This included changes to government 
involvement in providing and regulating transport, technical improvements, 
company attempts to contain costs and pressure from customers. The report went 
on to note that there was now a growing body of evidence that best practice in 
efficiency is jeopardizing best practice in safety (House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and Arts, 2000:93). The 
Report noted it had received many submissions that competitive pressures were 
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the most important factor contributing to fatigue. In relation to road transport in 
particular, the report noted evidence on the impact of competition on freight rates 
and the effects of this, in turn, on safety as well as the dangers posed by paying 
drivers on the basis of kilometers driven. Without disputing this evidence the 
Report then argued that there was little the government could do to intervene in 
economic matters; that some companies would make poor or good commercial 
decisions; and government responsibility should be to protect third parties such as 
other road users. The Report recommended state, territory and federal government 
cooperation to develop programs to enhance business skills and the federal 
Minister for Transport and Regional Services conduct a series of industry round 
table meetings to examine the extent that economic pressures pose a threat to 
public safety and measures in relation to improve staffing levels and freight rates. 
As noted elsewhere (Quinlan, 2001) the logic of the report is, at times, perplexing 
– seeing freight rates as a potential stimulus for regulatory action to protect public 
safety but not, apparently those who drive trucks.  
 
22) Research and reports undertaken in other countries indicated that the linkages 
between payment/reward systems and road transport safety were not confined to 
Australia. A US study by Braver et al. (1999) found shippers contributed to the 
tight schedules on drivers but other factors like delays also exerted an influence. 
In the USA Belzer and colleagues (for a summary see Belzer et al, 2003 and 
Rodriguez et al, 2003, 2006) undertook a carrier-based (the second largest by 
truckload-sector in the USA) study on the association between payment levels and 
safety. Following up on the consequences of a substantial pay increase in this firm 
in the 1990s their study identified a significant link between overall payment 
levels and safety (ie higher pay was strongly associated with reduced crashes). 
They found that the pay increase influenced safety by modifying the behaviour of 
drivers, with data indicating drivers had better crash records after the increase 
(controlling for demographic, occupational and personal characteristics). Like 
Hensher et al, Belzer et al (2003) found that the more wasted (ie unpaid) time 
drivers have the more likely they are to squeeze too many hours into a day, 
forcing schedule irregularity and excessive hours. Belzer argued that the 
consequent safety risk could be reduced by charging shippers and consignors for 
delay time and paying drivers for this time so they log it on as duty (measures to 
reduce driver turnover were also advocated).  
 
23) In sum, Belzer et al found a clear association between safety outcomes and 
payment levels and systems, especially trip-based pay. In a paper summarising 
this research published in a leading journal (Rodriguez et al 2006: 222) they 
concluded that the results “suggest that the pay increase influenced safety by 
modifying the behaviour of current drivers. The data indicate that drivers had 
better crash records after the pay increase, when the analysis controls for 
demographic, occupational and human capital characteristics. It is unclear 
whether the improvement in the drivers’ safety records was the result of more 
careful driving, perhaps due to increased costs of leaving the firm, a desire for 
less effort (a labour leisure trade off), or other related behaviour adjustments.” 
After indicating the need for further research with regard to the precise causal 
chain the authors note that they found mixed evidence on the human capital 
contribution to crash outcomes (notably that a reduction in drive turnover of itself 
did not improve crash outcomes but rather the retention of older and more 
 18
experienced drivers). Notwithstanding the acknowledged limits of a single 
company study the authors conclude that the findings inform policy interventions, 
notably the connection between payments and regulatory controls relating to 
fatigue/hours and speeding. It is also worth noting that Professor Belzer submitted 
expert evidence to the Mutual Responsibility Test Case before the NSW Industrial 
Relations Test Case (Transport Industry – Mutual Responsibility for Road Safety 
(State) Award and Contract Determination (No. 2), Re [2006] NSWIRComm 
328). Professor Belzer’s evidence was not challenged by employer representatives 
and was also accepted by the full bench in handing down its decision. 
 
24) The Review understands that Professor Belzer is currently working on a Large 
Truck Crash Causation Study data for the US Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA) merging a series of data sets to examine the same 
question, namely the link between pay and safety.  This study will provide more 
aggregate data (ie not company specific), with predicted completion towards the 
end of this year. The undertaking of such a study by the FMCSA – the key federal 
government agency responsible for heavy vehicle safety - is indicative of the 
growing importance with which the pay/safety connection is viewed in terms of 
improving road safety.  
 
25) Other overseas studies point to the complex interaction between scheduling 
pressure and payment systems For example, Arboleda, Morrow, Crum and 
Shelley (2003) found that driver scheduling autonomy was not a predictor of 
safety, something they attributed to the poor regulation of driving hours, lack of 
compensation for non-driving work, and linking pay to mileage, which provided a 
powerful incentive for drivers to exercise autonomy by driving longer. In a later 
article on the antecedents of fatigue, near misses and crashes amongst drivers US 
researchers Morrow and Crum (2005: 67) argued that different driver payment 
schemes (by the mile, hour or load) should be incorporated into future studies. 
 
26) Similar findings can be found in government reports undertaken outside Australia. 
For example, an inquiry into truck safety in New Zealand (Storey, 1996) 
emphasised the significant role of economic incentives in regulatory evasion. 
Tendering practices common in the industry contained a number of elements 
clearly not conducive to safe operation.  For example, tenders often took little 
explicit account of how a task was to be completed or other safety related issues 
and often quoted ‘all in’ prices that placed cost burdens on the transport company 
even for events beyond its control or due to customer inefficiency. Contracts often 
did not impose/enforce waiting time charges meaning that the customer had no 
incentive, other than their own convenience, for unloading trucks promptly. Given 
that local delivery drivers were paid on an hourly basis there was often an 
incentive to leave long distance trucks waiting. Delays exacerbated pressure to 
arrive early to beat the queue or race to get to the next job, especially amongst 
owner/drivers but also fleet drivers. 
 
27) In 2000 the NSW Motor Accidents Authority commissioned an inquiry for the 
NSW government that specifically focused on the relationship between 
commercial or industrial practices and safety in the transport industry, including 
evidence on the relationship between pay levels or systems of remuneration and 
safety outcomes (Quinlan, 2001). The Inquiry’s terms of reference covered the 
 19
effects of commercial power exercised by clients, the use of elaborate 
subcontracting networks, delays/waiting time, operator margins, delays/non-
payment to owner/drivers, enforcement of awards/agreements covering employee 
drivers and assessing the effectiveness of various types of regulation as well as 
other measures to improve safety. It should be noted that the Inquiry drew on 
evidence from all Australian jurisdictions (not just NSW) from a wide range of 
sources, including interviews with over 100 stakeholders and over 40 detailed 
submissions as well as examining the evidence presented to earlier inquiries into 
the road transport industry, commissioned research (including a survey of 300 
long haul truck drivers) and relevant evidence from overseas, most notably the 
USA. Putting this evidence together, the Inquiry reached the conclusion that 
commercial arrangements between an array of parties to the transport of freight, 
including load owners/clients and receivers, consignors and brokers, freight 
forwarders, large and small fleets as well as owner/drivers have a significant 
influence on safety. Customer and consignor requirements on price, schedules and 
loading/unloading and freight contracts more generally, in conjunction with the 
atomistic and intensely competitive nature of the industry, encourage problematic 
tendering practices, unsustainable freight rates and dangerous work practices. 
 
28) Amongst the more important specific findings of the NSW Trucking Safety report 
were:  
• That there were serious questions in relation to the ongoing economic viability 
of many operators, if not the industry more generally. This evidence 
included the level of turnover of trucking operators in the past decade, 
submissions from small and larger operators as well as insurers. Detailed 
statistical analysis by Dean Croke (1998 and further evidence presented to 
the Inquiry) found that for most of the 1990s returns to not only small to 
medium operators but also large operators did not provide an adequate rate 
of return for long term sustainability and this, in turn, was incompatible with 
safe operation. Other evidence as well as submissions from owner/drivers, 
small fleet operators and more unexpected sources like insurers supported 
this interpretation. Low freight rates were widely seen as a direct threat to 
safe operations because they encouraged pushing the margins (cuts to 
maintenance, more trips in given period, speeding etc). Low freight rates 
were seen to originate from: 
• The pressure of customers in a strong bargaining position (and without – in 
practice - the restraint of any accompanying OHS responsibilities) 
exacerbated by expectations of freight-rate cuts fostered in conjunction with 
the GST. 
• Intense competition amongst transport operators and the use of pyramid 
subcontracting by larger firms to capture work at reduced rates. The Inquiry 
Report devoted considerable attention to describing and presenting evidence 
on the increased use of subcontracting chains to drive down freight rates. It 
was noteworthy that representatives of large transport operator readily 
conceded that they engaged in this practice to meet the stringent cost 
demands of clients (note: this is directly relevant to the terms of the current 
Review). 
• Poor business practices on the part of many (especially small) operators who 
focus on cash flows rather long term sustainable returns although the limited 
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bargaining power of such operators also makes it difficult for them to charge 
more ‘realistic’ rates. 
• A regulatory environment where failure to abide by safety and other standards 
is not only possible but may actually deliver an economic advantage.  
• Externalities (such as the full cost of the resulting injuries, deaths and illness) 
and the absence of competitive neutrality (for example, in terms of road/rail 
infrastructure investment/cost recovery and regulatory requirements) act as a 
hidden subsidy to freight rates. 
• The use of performance base payment systems (including industrial 
agreements) and widespread evasion of minimum award entitlements for 
drivers that effectively encouraged illegal driving practices and enabled cost 
savings to be made. The link between pay rates and safety was clearly 
recognized by some trucking operator representatives with the president of 
the NSW Road Transport Association Paul Campbell subsequently urging 
all operators to pay award rates, arguing “If we sit on our hands and do 
nothing, and we continue to have ‘at fault’ accidents at this rate, the 
insurance industry will come in and clean us up” (Australasian Transport 
News, 28 March 2002:17). 
• Job insecurity fears of both employee and owner drivers make it more likely 
that they will accommodate to dangerous work practices rather than 
registering complaints to transport companies or customers. 
• Research by Williamson et al (2000), and the Inquiry’s own survey, provided 
evidence of an association between tight schedules, delivery time 
bonus/penalties and performance-based payment systems (eg kilometer-
based rates) and both chronic injury and the propensity of drivers to engage 
in dangerous practices (such as speeding and excessive hours). Yet 
bonus/penalty systems remain common. The report also considered the 
research of Professor Michael Belzer on the link between pay and safety in 
the US trucking industry (discussed above).  
 
29) The NSW Trucking Safety Report’s findings on the relationship between 
commercial pressures/practices (such as elaborate subcontracting chains, intense 
competition, operator turnover, low freight rates and performance-based payment 
systems) and safety in the long haul trucking industry were widely accepted and 
brought about a number of regulatory changes in New South Wales (notably a 
new OHS fatigue regulation covering long haul drivers New South Wales 
Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Long Distance Truck Fatigue) 
Regulation 2005) as well as being taken up by subsequent industrial tribunal 
hearings, government inquiries and coronial inquests). The evidence on 
commercial pressures and the links to pay and safety were accepted in a test case 
before the NSW Industrial Relations Commission (Transport Industry – Mutual 
Responsibility for Road Safety (State) Award and Contract Determination (No. 2), 
Re [2006] NSWIRComm 328), along with evidence from Professors Belzer and 
Williamson.  
 
30) The NSW Trucking Safety Report’s findings were also accepted in coronial 
inquests and in court proceedings. In January 2003 the NSW Deputy State 
Coroner Dorelle Pinch issued a supplement to her findings in relation to the death 
of three truck drivers (Barry Supple, Timothy Walsh and Anthony Forsyth). It is 
worth noting that these drivers died in a variety of circumstances including truck 
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crash and a drug induced cardiac arrest at a truck stop. In her supplementary 
report the Coroner identified a number of common factors in the deaths including 
fatigue, drugs, falsified logbooks, pressure for deliveries, operator viability and 
the absence of any medical testing of driver health – with the exception of the 
latter all of these factors had been dealt with in some depth by the NSW Trucking 
Safety Report (and makes direct reference to the report as identifying the 
underlying causes of poor safety outcomes as well as ways of remedying this). In 
her observations the Coroner emphasized the need to deal with the underlying 
problem rather than symptoms and stated (at page 4: emphasis in original) “As 
long as driver payments are based on a (low) rate per kilometer there will 
always been an incentive for drivers to maximise the hours they drive, not 
because they are greedy but simply to earn a decent wage. I anticipate that this 
incentive will remain an overriding concern for drivers irrespective of legal and 
safety considerations.”. In May 2008 a judgement was handed down in the 
County Court of Victoria in relation to another long haul truck driver who died of 
a drug induced cardiac arrest (Albert, Ruth v M. and V. Brown Pty Ltd, County 
Court of Victoria, Case No. 1179 of 2006, Reasons for Judgement 13 May 2008). 
The presiding judge (Coish J) accepted evidence relating to the use of drugs 
within the industry (including the expert testimony of Professor Drummer of 
Monash University) and its connection to aspects of work in the industry 
including long hours/fatigue and delays/waiting time to load/unload. 
 
31) In 2002 the Australian Transport Council (ATC) established a Standing 
Committee On Transport (SCOT) working group to investigate the issue of safe 
sustainable rates for owner drivers (consistent with one of the major 
recommendations of the NSW Trucking Safety Inquiry). The working group 
issued a discussion paper in May 2003 (Standing Committee On Transport 
working group, 2003). A consultant report commissioned by the working group 
confirmed the very low rates of earnings amongst owner operators. Unfortunately, 
as far as I am aware the working group did not commission independent research 
to specifically investigate the link between low returns and safety (and the ATC’s 
consideration of this matter appears to have lapsed in 2004).  The May 2003 
discussion paper summarized existing research, the overwhelming bulk of which 
was dealt with in the 2001 NSW Trucking Safety Inquiry.  The Discussion Paper 
(at page 6) argued that the evidence linking financial pressure and road safety as 
‘mixed and inconclusive’.  
 
32) The last contention is problematic on a number of grounds. There is a body of 
evidence finding an association between payment/reward systems and related 
commercial pressures on safety (not all of which is considered by the discussion 
paper) where there is little if any evidence specifically refuting such a link. Most 
of the research cited by the SCOT report is at best inconclusive rather than mixed. 
To have genuinely mixed results a number of contrary findings are required (ie 
studies that find pay and rewards are not linked to safety). Further, evidence based 
on research is commonly mixed. The real question is whether there is a weight of 
evidence favouring one interpretation over another. In this case there is. Most of 
the studies cited did find a relationship between financial pressures/reward 
systems and safety in relation to some aspects of driver behaviour and OHS.  
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33) The contrary evidence raised by the Discussion Paper is confined to examples of 
findings failing to link (rather than positively refuting) a relationship between 
particular categories of drivers (owner drivers and small/medium or large firm 
employee drivers) and crash experience. There are four significant problems with 
this counterpoint. 
 
a) First, the point relies on an over-simplification of the actual evidence from the 
survey of 300 drivers undertaken as part of the NSW Trucking Safety Report. 
While the overall crash rate was similar between the three groups more 
owner/drivers reported involvement in serious crashes in the past 12 months 
than large fleet drivers (and slightly less than small fleet drivers). With regard 
to the previous five years a higher proportion of owner/drivers reported 
involvement in serious crashes than either small or large fleet drivers. As has 
been argued elsewhere (Mayhew and Quinlan, 2006) the narrower gap 
between owner/drivers and small fleet drivers in terms of crashes (and other 
OHS outcomes) when compared to large fleet employees is not surprising 
given the place of small firms in the transport supply chain (see also earlier 
findings of Hensher).  
 
b) Second, the point is restricted to crash-related incidents rather than a broader 
array of OHS outcomes (including chronic injury and health effects). While it 
may be understandable that transport authorities are most interested in truck 
crashes this is too narrow (and was not the approach taken in the 2001 NSW 
Trucking Safety Inquiry). The survey associated with this Report found both a 
substantial level of reported chronic injury (around 50% of respondents) as 
well as significant differences in reported injury amongst different categories 
of drivers with, for example, owner drivers and small fleet drivers being more 
likely to report a chronic back injury (over 33%) than large fleet employees 
(23.5%). Owner/drivers were also more likely to experience occupational 
violence. The survey also assessed driver health using the 12 point General 
Health Questionnaire – an internationally accepted tool for measuring worker 
stress and wellbeing. The mean GHQ score for owner/drivers (11.5) was 
higher than that of small and large fleet drivers (9.8 and 10 respectively). The 
survey results also indicated that the predominant independent variable was 
economic stress.  The lowest GHQ-12 scores were found amongst those truck 
drivers paid on the award rate while the highest scores were recorded amongst 
owner/drivers with insecure and highly variable incomes. An examination of 
routes and qualitative responses reinforced the economic pressure connection. 
The Hume Highway – the busiest and most competitive route in Australia 
connecting Sydney to Melbourne – accounted for 40.4% of over 14 scores (but 
only 26.3% of driver interviews). Qualitative responses from drivers when 
asked to nominate their most serious safety concerns reinforced the conclusion 
that freight rates and economic pressures were a significant safety issue. 
 
c) Third, there are a number of reasons why comparisons of different categories 
of drivers may not show the differences in crashes presumed by the Discussion 
Paper and these were dealt with in the NSW Report and in subsequent 
reports/publications on road transport OHS. One reason is that the competitive 
pressure of underpaid owner-drivers appears to have led to an increased use of 
trip-based payment systems for employee drivers. At the very least, the 
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differences in payment regime between owner/drivers and employee drivers 
are less than might be expected. Trip-based payment encourages hazardous 
driving practices, irrespective of whether those drivers are owner-operators or 
employees. A related point that is ignored by the Discussion Paper but 
receives some considerable attention in the NSW Trucking Safety Report is 
the problem of underpayment of employee drivers (ie payment below award 
rates). Evidence to the inquiry suggested under-payment was a widespread 
problem. Again, underpayment of employee drivers narrows the reward gap 
with owner-drivers and therefore could help explain the absence of significant 
differences in crash rates (though note too the differences in responses as to 
what constitutes a serious incident identified in the driver survey undertaken in 
conjunction with that inquiry). In sum, comparisons between different 
categories of drivers are likely to understate the effect of economic pressures 
on OHS outcomes or overlook flow-on effects on non-contingent workers (this 
limitation is being increasingly recognised in research into contingent work 
arrangements. See for example, George, Chattopadhyay, Lawrence & 
Shulman, 2003). 
 
d) Fourth, the SCOT report fails to consider the Hensher et al research in depth 
nor the more recent research by Williamson which showed a clear link 
between payment systems unsafe work practices including working while 
fatigued and drug use.  
 
34) The Report of Inquiry into Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors (a far more 
substantial and researched document than the SCOT Working Group Discussion 
Paper just referred to) undertaken by Industrial Relations Victoria (2005: 14-17) 
reproduced the NSW Trucking Safety Report’s (Quinlan, 2001) major findings in 
relation to commercial practices and low freight rates, arguing that it had dealt 
with these issues in ‘a very comprehensive fashion’. The later sections of the 
Report discussing health and safety and driver well-being and family life drew 
extensively on the Report (Industrial Relations Victoria (2005: 106-110,113). 
Unlike the SCOT Working Group Discussion Paper this Report makes reference 
to other evidence from this Report relating to the OHS consequences of economic 
pressures (including chronic injuries and GHQ scores). 
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Evidence tendered to this Review, including contrary arguments and alternate 
remedies 
 
35) In the course of evaluating the evidence presented to this Review pertaining to a 
relationship between remuneration and safety emphasis was placed on the 
capacity to provide supporting evidence or to substantiate claims made. Thus, for 
example, during interviews with owner/drivers and employees drivers or operators 
who indicated they believed remuneration rates or systems were compromising 
safety the Review sought examples or illustrations (where such material was not 
already provided in statements). 
 
36) The Review received a number of submissions from owner/drivers or small 
operators and interviews were conducted with owner/drivers in Brisbane, Sydney 
and Melbourne. A considerable number of those interviewed (indeed the vast 
majority) did not appear at the behest of the Transport Workers’ Union and from 
what could be ascertained in interviews had no connection to the union. At the 
same time the views they expressed were consistent and did not differ in 
substance from those of both employee and owner/drivers who gave evidence to 
the Review as part of the TWU submission (see below). The vast majority of 
owner/drivers interviewed were very experienced operators, most with over 20 
years in the industry, including a considerable period as an owner/operator. 
 
37) There was virtual unanimity amongst owner/drivers and small operators (such as 
those five or six trucks) interviewed  that remuneration was linked to safety and 
that inadequate remuneration led to compromises or poor practices in relation to 
the safety and health of truck drivers and the safety of other road users. Consistent 
with evidence presented to earlier reviews, owner/drivers indicated that rates paid 
by clients had been stagnant for some time (except for fuel levy increases and 
even here the timing of adjustments was often critical); provided at best a 
marginal rate of return (and not even operational cost-recovery in the case of 
backloading as clients and brokers took advantage of the imbalance of freight 
movements between major destinations like Melbourne and Brisbane); and that 
operators also had to deal with delays and non-payment (where time and cost 
considerations discouraged resort to the courts). A more general complaint was 
made about the activities of some freight forwarders or loading agents, who 
negotiated a rate with a client or transport operator and then subcontracted the task 
to the owner/operator (to accommodate their commission) at rate that was not 
viable but that, in the circumstances, the latter felt obliged to accept in order to 
secure a load. A submission from the Transport Workers Union (TWU) essentially 
supported this point, arguing that the role of freight forwarders/loading agents had 
detrimental effects where they essentially subcontracted urgent or contingent work 
from other transport operators (and thereby took part of an already negotiated 
transport price) and because competition amongst freight forwarders/brokers 
themselves placed downward pressure on rates. These problems can be seen as 
specific part of the problem of progressive rate cutting in multi-tiered 
subcontracting that has already been referred to. 
 
38) Owner operators also complained about penalties or risk of contract loss for late 
delivery as well as frequent prolonged and unpaid (ie no demurrage) delays in 
loading/unloading – arguing they had not experienced significant improvements in 
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the latter over the past five years (contradictory to the evidence of several trucking 
clients referred to later). The times cited with regard to waiting times were 
consistent with those identified in earlier inquiries. 
 
39) In addition, owner drivers and small operators made reference to two practices not 
referred to in earlier reviews. One was a requirement by clients that drivers phone 
their destination about three hours prior to arrival which could result in a re-
scheduling of the time (for example, telling the driver not to arrive until some time 
later, thus avoiding a queue at the warehouse, store or distribution centre). As 
noted below, a number of major clients denied using this practice although 
owner/operators were emphatic that the practice occurred. A second practice was 
recipient-generated invoicing. Owner/drivers and small operators complained that 
clients (or other trucking operators in the case of a subcontracting arrangement) 
would offer a verbal contract but, rather than accepting an invoice from the 
operator, then generate their own invoice with different terms and conditions to 
those agreed to (or impose deductions that reduced the effective rate paid). 
Recipient-invoicing was seen as an entirely acceptable and indeed efficient 
practice by some interviewed by the Review but owner/drivers and small 
operators largely saw it as a means of exploiting their already vulnerable position.  
 
40) Following on from the last point owner/drivers and small operators repeatedly 
emphasized that their capacity to determine rates sufficient to sustain their 
business was limited if not entirely negated by their inferior bargaining capacity 
when dealing with large clients or larger transport operators as part of a multi-
tiered subcontracting chain. A number stated they had refused to work for a 
particular clients or operators following experiences they found unacceptable. At 
the same time, intense competition for the pool of available work distributed 
through subcontracting chains meant they were at the bottom of the freight task 
‘food chain’ with little choice about key contract conditions. In addition to rates 
this might specify whether an owner/operator could use their own trailer 
(prohibition of the latter could result in the parking and non-return financially on 
an expensive piece of equipment).  
 
41) The submission of a small Queensland-based operator (Tim Squires of Tothag 
Transport Group) illustrated how imbalances in bargaining power and the attitude 
of some powerful parties effectively subverted attempts to establish viable rates. 
After noting the importance of small/medium operators and owner/drivers as part 
of multi-tiered subcontracting network for delivering freight Mr Squires stated (at 
page 2) “I was in the position earlier this year where I was given the opportunity 
to offer a quote to a large national company for the provision of local distribution 
shuttle services on a 24/5 basis to a national supplier of a food product…The 
prime contractor asked for full cost disclosure. As is normal practice, I submitted 
my quotation on a cost plus margin basis, only to be informed by the contract 
manager of this large multi national that, given the fact that I would own the 
assets (vehicles) at the end of the contract period, I should not be looking to 
attract a margin but quote for cost recovery and a small overhead recovery 
component. He would not discuss a formula for fuel recovery in the event of 
volatile increases, only to say that we would discuss it at the time. Needless to say 
I walked away at this point.” 
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42) The mirror image of capacity to obtain viable rates for owner/drivers and small 
operators was their capacity genuine cost increases. With regard to this, the first of 
term of reference for the Review, owner/drivers expressed general dissatisfaction 
with current arrangements for recovering genuine cost increases. While 
mechanisms sometimes existed with regard to particular clients or large operators 
they were no means standard practice, key conditions varied (like the period of 
adjustment for changes in fuel charges) and no were these conditions always 
adhered to. One Queensland operator observed (Frank Black) “At the moment 
there is no real system by which operators can recover their costs, such as 
increased fuel costs through fuel spikes, increased maintenance costs, spares, 
tyres, and the increased cost of living on the road (meals etc)  are all being 
absorbed by the operator. Very few companies are passing on the correct fuel levy 
with some not passing on any at all. Usually any request made for greater 
payment is met by a response of ‘take or leave it we can get someone else to do 
the job.’”  
 
43) These views were echoed by the submission of Victorian Paul Freestone who 
stated (at page 1) that there “was no system in place to cover genuine increases 
for the transport operator. It is up to the operator to negotiate with the freight 
forwarder. This person is usually in middle management (on some sort of bonus 
system). His job is to keep profits high, costs low. The owner/driver is at the mercy 
of this person, and depending on market forces may or may not gain any 
increases. Only when the source dries up, does the operator have a change (sic) of 
genuine increases.” Mr Freestone went onto indicate that the situation was 
exacerbated by delays to payment – effectively a credit system that favoured 
freight forwarders without any commensurate debt security for the operator. He 
urged government intervention to establish a no-credit/payment on completion 
system with minimum rates and adjustment mechanisms. Jerry Brown-Sarre 
(written submission of Australian Long Distance Owners and Drivers Association 
at page 3) also referred to lengthening periods of payment delay/interest-free 
credit since the 1970s. 
 
44) Asked by the Review to indicate how rates and related commercial arrangements 
affected safety and health, owner/operators made the following points. First, it 
was contended that without some action on rates it would be impossible for them 
to abide by the new national fatigue regulations. Operators believed the new 
regulations would not enable them to negotiate higher rates, with some indicating 
they would have to have to break the law to survive. Second, another fatigue 
related issue raised was that the imposition of higher rates on long haul drivers 
would discourage the use of these drivers for local deliveries. Third, a number of 
small operators argued that they had responded to poor remuneration by cutting 
costs in relation to truck maintenance and repair. Examples given included 
lengthening periods between major services, operators undertaking some 
specialist repairs (like brakes) themselves, increased use of re-tread tires and even 
re-grooving tires (one operator indicated he had purchased a re-groover). It was 
acknowledged that such measures could entail additional operational costs in the 
longer term as well as safety risks.  Fourth, the imposition of late delivery 
penalties (of say $100) or risk losing a contract was seen to encourage speeding or 
failure to take breaks. Fifth, poor rates and trip-based pay were seen to lead to 
attempts to squeeze in more trips in a week to cover costs, with flow on effects to 
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scheduling as well as the OHS effects of the additional workload. Sixth, another 
issue raised was the stress factor in worrying about meeting financial 
commitments – something consistent with earlier research on higher general 
health questionnaire (GHQ) scores (a measure of distress) amongst owner/drivers 
(Mayhew and Quinlan, 2006). In evaluating these contentions the Review sought 
detailed examples from operators where-ever possible. While such anecdotal 
evidence needs to be treated with caution it is broadly consistent with evidence 
given to earlier inquiries (Quinlan, 2001), with research undertaken by Professor 
Williamson and with much, though not all, other evidence tendered to this 
Review. 
 
45) Owner/drivers were not simply concerned for their own safety and the wellbeing 
of their families that might flow from a serious incident or a premature disabling 
health condition due to stress, cumulative sleep deprivation and the like (not to 
mention instances of family members, such as children, riding in trucks – the 
tragic consequences of which have demonstrated on a number of occasions). 
Owner/drivers also expressed concern for the safety of other road users and the 
community more generally. Typical was the statement of a Queensland-based 
operator (written submission Frank Black): “At the end of the day it is obvious 
that for drivers or operators to be able to perform their duties safety and 
professionally they need to be viable. In my opinion, and the opinion of many 
other road transport operators that I come into contact with, the broader 
community could also see benefits in the manner of properly maintained vehicles 
and improved operating practices, helping to provide safer conditions on our 
roads that our industry and broader community share.” The issue of and benefit 
to public safety on the roads was raised by a number of other parties making 
submissions to this Review and is a matter warranting serious consideration. 
 
46)  The submission (at page 1) of the Tasmanian Forest Contractors’ Association 
expressed similar views to those just made. Referring to a limited capacity to 
recover costs the TFCA stated that “…not every business is able to readily 
increase their rates. This is certainly the position of the forest industry where 
haulers and harvesters are very much ‘price takers’ rather than ‘price setters’ 
and the entire industry is to a greater extent, reliant on the interaction of 
international markets. It is certainly the experience of TFCA and its members that 
links exist between rates and safety outcomes. Reports of vehicles not being 
effectively maintained due to rising costs and inadequate revenues are increasing. 
Unfortunately the ability to invest and innovate in an effort to combat production 
cost increases is often not within the realms of many operators due to low rates 
and limited contract longevity.” The Review is aware that the forestry industry 
approached Workplace Standards Tasmania (WST) several years ago with a view 
to it assisting them to address the nexus between rates and safety. The Review is 
also aware that an experienced WST forestry inspector viewed the piecework 
payment of forestry harvester and haulers as amongst the most (if not the most 
significant) serious source of OHS risks in the industry.  
 
47) In terms of addressing the remuneration/safety nexus, the vast majority of 
owner/drivers or small operators interviewed or making written submissions (such 
as the submission from Be Betts of Betts Transport Pty Ltd) urged that the 
government to intervene to establish safe rates. A number like that of Jerry 
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Brown-Sarre (submission of Australian Long Distance Owners and Drivers 
Association which called for a mandatory code) specifically referred to the failure 
of repeated attempts over many years to set rates on a consensual or voluntary 
basis. Most believed this should be done directly though a small number favoured 
more indirect mechanisms (such as a government watchdog to oversee industry 
association and unions setting ‘indicative minimum rates’). Some submissions 
suggested that there would be some flexibility in payment methods regarding 
different types of freight (written submission of Noreen Petrovic, a Western 
Australian operator). For its part, the TFCA urged the introduction of legislation, 
requiring the use of agreed cost models, with mechanisms for rate increases, 
dispute resolution processes and plain English contracts. 
 
48) Given that owner/drivers and employee drivers perform essentially the same work 
the setting of minimum rates for owner/drivers needed to be matched to providing 
better protection to employee drivers. Like a number of other parties (medium 
sized operators, the TWU and some industry bodies – see below), some small 
operators were critical of the shift to a more fragmented bargaining/award 
structure in recent years and urged the re-establishment of industry-wide award 
structure that also recognised driver grades and different equipments. For 
example, Tim Squires, director of Tothag Transport Group (at page 4) called for 
the “re-introduction of a fair and equitable award system (rather than the current 
awards that can not even be used as a reasonable guideline) that recognises 
payments for differing skill levels of the various driver grades and the differing 
equipment types within these grades. A meaningful award system, re-introducing 
the discipline of regular driver payment reviews, will ensure that the playing field 
is leveled to the degree that at least one major component of the vehicle running 
cost is not open to exploitation. It will also ensure that our drivers, as the 
backbone of the industry, are fairly rewarded and are able to make a reasonable 
living from the tasks that they perform. Again, reward for effort” (emphasis in 
original). 
 
49) The Review also interviewed a number of medium-sized operators. Here there 
was some divergence of opinion. Those who appeared with the Australian 
Trucking Association tended to support the ATA’s views (discussed below) while 
those appearing independently expressed views more consistent with that of 
owner/drivers and small operators just described. One Queensland based operator 
with 110 trucks and 150-160 employee drivers indicated that it paid an hourly rate 
for local work and a kilometer rate for other work (with an hourly rate kicking in 
when delays were experienced). This company operated a fatigue management 
program in conjunction with the use of global positioning technology, on-board 
truck monitoring (to manage driver behaviour) and independent random drug 
testing. It noted smaller companies lacked the resources to avail themselves of 
GPS and truck monitoring technologies (recording speed, braking behaviour and 
the like). The company praised enforcement measures by Queensland Transport 
though the view was expressed that a number of serious incidents involving 
subcontractors and long hours and drugs had not been fully investigated. At the 
same time, managers noted that changes to rules allowing large trucks (and bigger 
loads) as well as improvements in road infrastructure (including bridges etc) did 
not benefit operators because any gains were passed directly to clients in the form 
of reduced freight charges. The company’s managers also stressed that 
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implementing its fatigue management regime required an increase in freight 
charges that resulted in the loss of its hitherto biggest customer and the pursuit of 
niche markets where cost-undercutting was less of an issue. In short, the company 
drew a direct connection between freight rates (and associated labour costs) and 
fatigue management. Consistent with other submissions, the company indicated 
that larger operators were able to deal with competitive pressures by 
subcontracting out tasks. 
 
50) The Transport Workers Union (TWU), including its Queensland and 
Victorian/Tasmanian branches as well as the federal office, made a series of 
written and verbal submissions to the Review, including the evidence of a number 
owner/driver and employee drivers affiliated to the union. The verbal evidence of 
owner/drivers was in agreement with that of non-union owner/drivers and small 
operators already discussed, arguing that poor remuneration/rates impacted on 
safety (with examples similar to those already mentioned such as a Queensland 
based driver stating he had been paid as little as half the rate for backloading and 
had consequently cut costs with regard to tyres and other essential maintenance). 
Like other owner/drivers, a number indicated there had been occasions when they 
were intimidated or threatened with losing their jobs if they asked for an increased 
rate or refused additional work on the grounds of fatigue or being ‘out of hours’. 
Like the majority of non-union owner/drivers spoken to by the Review, they urged 
that a mandatory regime for setting minimum safe rates be introduced. In New 
South Wales, a number of heavy vehicle owner/drivers in the short haul sector 
presented evidence on their experience with the contract determination system that 
operates under that state’s industrial relations legislation. In essence, they 
confirmed that this system operated effectively to protect their interests in terms of 
safety: setting minimum rates that were sustainable, could accommodate the needs 
of particular subsectors of activity (examples cited included concrete delivery), 
contained appropriate cost-adjustment mechanisms and a regular review process 
(that entailed collective negotiation), and where there was general employer 
compliance with terms and conditions. This evidence is consistent with the 
submission of the NSW government which provides a detailed history of the 
development and operations of contract determinations in the road transport 
sector. 
 
51) For their part, employee drivers giving verbal evidence to the Review also 
indicated that payment systems and levels had compromised safety in the industry. 
A Queensland based employee driver who had worked for a number of major 
operators stated he had recently experienced a roll-over after falling asleep behind 
the wheel. He admitted doing illegal hours, stating that like other drivers he was 
afraid of losing his job. The driver also contended that the low remuneration and 
standards in the industry meant it ended recruiting persons who couldn’t get work 
elsewhere. 
 
52) In addition to verbal statements to the Review at meetings held in Sydney, 
Brisbane and Melbourne, the written submission included statements from 20 
drivers from Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia as well 
as an additional 31 driver statements submitted to the Senate Inquiry into the 
Independent Contractors Bill 2005. These statements cover drivers engaged in a 
wide range of different road freight transport activities. Again, these statements 
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essentially reinforce oral statements made to the Review, and as such, they will 
not be reproduced except to provide some additional insights or illustrative 
examples. With regard to the latter, a Victorian-based owner/driver drew a stark 
connection between rates, sustainability and safety (statement at page 74 of the 
TWU submission): “The inability to pay your bills on time has a big impact on 
safety. I’ve just paid $2600 mechanics bill, a lot of blokes can’t afford it. If they 
can’t afford to repair their trucks, they will plumb it up and just make do until 
they can afford it. Blokes don’t want to drive around in a broken down truck, they 
just have no other option, they just can’t afford to fix it. You can’t save on 
registration, insurance and fuel and we’re working on the same rates we were 
getting 20 years ago – how can anyone be expected to have a viable business. 
 
53) Echoing this, a Queensland-based owner/driver admitted he was behind in his 
maintenance because business was a little slow and he was obliged to drive unsafe 
until income allowed him to pay for these repairs (statement at page 85 of TWU 
submission). Another owner/driver stated (statement at page 78 of the TWU 
submission): “In my experience larger companies dictate the prices of transport 
and force smaller companies to cut corners to make up the money which creates a 
situation that isn’t safe or sustainable.” An owner driver in the milk industry 
from South Australia with 26 years experience also referred (statement at page 
102 of the TWU submission) to the erosion of rates and his need work hours “I 
felt were unsafe due to the time constraints of customers, who can be quite 
demanding.” 
 
54) A number of employee drivers made also reference to how multi-tiered 
subcontracting of freight tasks and trip/kilometre based payment affected them in 
ways similar to owner drivers, and their awareness of pressures on the latter 
(experience of working under both regimes was not uncommon and is indicative 
of inter-changeability of employment status in the industry).  For example, a 
Queensland-based driver who now worked for a large operator spoke of his prior 
experience (statement at page 91 of TWU submission): “On occasion I have had 
to work more hours than I felt were safe because of low rates of remuneration 
when I drove only under cents per kilometre rate for previous employers. In order 
to earn a decent level of income I had to do numerous long runs and on most trips 
I felt unable to take a rest break because I felt pressured to continue driving in 
order to meet the strict deadlines to get back.”  
 
55) Another employee driver from Western Australia stated (at pages 7-8 of the TWU 
submission): “In the past I have been offered – and accepted out of necessity, 
working conditions that I know were unsafe. I accepted them because I needed to 
feed my children. In some cases drivers are paid safe rates, in many cases 
however employers and principal contractors try to make as much profit as they 
can by reducing their labour costs. I personally know of many drivers whose 
extremely high running costs make it difficult to stay afloat. They cut a lot of 
corners to keep their trucks on the road…In my experience kilometre rates mean 
drivers work harder and faster which induces fatigue and increases the chances of 
accidents. I have personally experienced fatigue because I was being paid per 
kilometre.”  Another employer driver from Victoria stated (at page 8 of the TWU 
submission) “I am paid by the hour, but know that there is no way you can survive 
on 7.6 hours pay a day so you work as much overtime as you can to survive. As a 
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result, I have driven whilst I’ve felt fatigued in order to finish the job and earn 
more money…I have experienced being pressured to accept lower rates in order 
to keep work and was told indirectly that I must do the job or face consequences 
such as termination.” 
 
56) While this evidence (and the earlier evidence of non-union affiliated owner 
drivers) may be viewed as only anecdotal it is entirely consistent with evidence 
tendered to previous inquires over the previous decade or more and also with 
evidence given under oath to court and tribunal proceedings. It also consistent 
with systematic research studies undertaken by Hensher, Williamson and 
Mayhew, amongst others over a more than 15 year period in Australia. The vast 
majority of the statements were made by drivers with considerable experience of 
the industry and in the view of this Review their views warrant serious 
consideration. 
 
57) In its written submission (at pages 4-7) the TWU also provided a detailed 
overview of documentary evidence linking payment levels and systems to safety 
outcomes in the road freight industry, including government reports, coronial 
inquests, tribunal hearings/court proceedings and academic research. Some of this 
evidence has already been discussed elsewhere in this Review (such as the 
research of Ann Williamson and Michael Belzer). However, other evidence 
introduced by the TWU included court decisions (R v Randall John Harm, District 
Court of New South Wales, per Graham J, 26th August 2005) and evidence given 
by officers of an industrial association (the NSW Road Transport Association) to 
the mutual responsibility test case referred to elsewhere in this Review (Transport 
Industry – Mutual Responsibility for Road Safety (State) Award and Contract 
Determination (No. 2), Re [2006] NSWIRComm 328) that agreed that low levels 
of pay and trip based payment schemes were connected to poor safety outcomes. 
 
58) With regard to remedies the TWU urged the introduction of minimum safe rates 
regime covering both employers and owner drivers – the mechanics of this are 
discussed elsewhere in the Review. The union argued that alternative options 
including recent initiatives with regard to unconscionable contracts were not a 
substitute for this. Thus, in a separate submission the Victorian/Tasmanian branch 
of the TWU stated that the Victorian Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors Act 
2005 had brought some improvements (in terms of a cost model and 
unconscionable contracts dispute mechanism) it did not establish a minimum rates 
structure – and this was what was required at national level. 
 
59) The Review received submissions from a number of other parties, including 
several state government agencies responsible for OHS and Professor Ann 
Williamson, whose earlier work on fatigue and OHS in the heavy vehicle road 
transport that linked remuneration to safety was discussed above. 
 
60) One state OHS authority provided the Review with a confidential copy of research 
on safety in the road transport industry prepared for it using a mixture of 
qualitative research (eight focus groups composed of long and short haul drivers 
in different sized operations, their spouse partners, owner/operators, OHS 
practitioners, employers/managers, government agency and industry 
representatives) and quantitative research (a telephone survey of 90 
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employer/managers and 250 road transport workers). The research identified three 
main safety issues of concern, namely the use of drugs, driver fatigue and 
loading/unloading issues. Examining where the culture of the industry needed to 
change the report identified a continuum where poor margins flowed onto the 
need for greater productivity and scheduling pressures, excessive hours and poor 
pay leading on to short cuts, less breaks, fatigue, drug use and safety not as a 
priority. The report also noted that factors challenging both employers and 
regulators included the mobile nature of workplaces and challenges in upholding 
industry wide standards in OHS. The Research also found that partners/spouses 
believed compliance with OHS standards in the transport industry was lower than 
other industries they were familiar with. More broadly, the study found that 
compliance was seen to be a problem but especially amongst smaller operators 
and owner/drivers who felt pressured to take as many jobs as possible in order to 
cover their costs. Suggested means of improvement from focus groups included 
consideration of a ‘pay by the hour’ regulation. In a verbal submission to the 
Review a representative of the authority indicated that the research had been 
undertaken following concerns at the high risk nature of the industry (rated worst 
in 2008) and the fact there had been no significant improvement in injury rates 
over the past five years (with between 1500 and 1600 serious injuries each year). 
The project was an attempt to look at the industry with ‘fresh eyes’ and also 
entailed discussions with inspectors. In terms of what needed to be addressed 
arising from this research, the representative emphasized the need to address the 
connection between pay/incentive (piece rate) payment systems and OHS (an 
association that had been found across very different sectors of the road transport 
industry, including for example couriers). 
 
61) The submission of another state OHS agency, Safework South Australia, argued 
that there was a significant body of academic and government research that 
confirmed a nexus between remuneration levels/performance-based payment 
methods of long distance road freight operators and poor OHS outcomes, 
including speeding, excessive hours/insufficient breaks/fatigue and drug use 
(some of the research referred to has already been cited in this Review but not all, 
see for example, Davey and Richards, 2004 study of drug use by long haul drivers 
and Inspector Campbell v James Gordon Hitchcock [2004] NSWIRComm 87 (21 
October 2004) at para 288 on incentive pay and excessive hours). While endorsing 
the new National Heavy Vehicle Driver Fatigue (HVDF) legislation the Safework 
submission argued (at page 1) that reduction of fatigue “for long distance truck 
drivers will only be achieved if the current performance based payment systems in 
the industry are reformed. Fatigue laws are a critical pre-condition to achieving 
improved safety outcomes in the industry. However, without measures to address 
the current remuneration structure, there will still be major economic incentives 
for truck drivers to engage in unsafe work practices. Such economic incentives 
towards unsafe work practices operate throughout the entire road freight 
industry.”  
 
62) In pointing to a regulatory solution the submission identified the South Australian 
mandatory Outworker Code – dealing with the implementation of minimum 
labour standards in complex supply chains – that was both modeled on earlier 
NSW legislation (but with provision to be more generic in application ie not 
confined to clothing workers) and was seen as ultimately forming part of a 
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consistent national code. The Safework South Australia submission (at page 4) 
also made reference to unconscionable contract provisions applying to 
owner/drivers under industrial relations laws in New South Wales and 
Queensland, identifying them as superior to provisions in the federal Independent 
Contractors Act 2006 (where a recent case Keldote and Riteway did not permit the 
conduct of the principal party to be taken into account and where the issue of 
whether drivers are entitled to damages remains undetermined). Safework South 
Australia expressed the view that the Independent Contractors Act would not 
operate as a de facto method of setting minimum rates for owner/drivers. While 
acknowledging the efforts of industry bodies to improve OHS it argued (at page 4) 
that legislative and policy developments must address the performance based 
remuneration system as a critical structural feature affecting safety in the industry. 
 
63) The Review obtained other documents that addressed the issue of remuneration 
and safety in road transport. For example, the Regulation Impact Statement: 
Owner Driver Regulation in Western Australia (no date) states (at pages 3-4) that 
anecdotal “evidence links low rates of pay with long hours of work and increased 
levels of fatigue. Safety concerns are not a key issue for owner drivers as such, as 
a range of regulatory processes are in place, such as occupational health and 
safety (OHS) legislation and recent ATC initiatives on driver fatigue. However, 
financial pressures can lead owner drivers to compromise on safety. 
Compromises typically include an increased propensity to speed, overload 
vehicles and/or minimise vehicle maintenance. Thus owner drivers’ inability to 
obtain a safe and sustainable freight rate may impact on their health and family 
relationships. Drivers that feel financially compelled to compromise safety are 
caught between bending the rules or going broke…Increases in fuel prices have 
exerted some financial pressure on owner drivers with marginal businesses, and 
have particularly affected long distance drivers. Moreover, some hirers have been 
charging higher rates to cover increasing fuel costs, but have not always passed 
on these higher rates to owner drivers.” Later (at page 9) it is noted that the 
Western Australian Long Distance Owner and Drivers Association had informed 
them that low rates had forced some WA owner drivers to increase their labour 
input to a level “they considered both unsafe and unsustainable.” Again, the 
above observations are consistent with the bulk of evidence obtained by this 
Review. 
 
64) In her written submission (elaborated on in a verbal presentation to the Review) 
Professor Ann Williamson stated that link between driver remuneration, payment 
methods and safety has been a serious but largely overlooked problem for heavy 
vehicle long distance road transport for many years. In her submission Professor 
Williamson made reference to a third survey of long distance truck drivers in 
NSW that updated and essentially confirmed earlier large surveys undertaken in 
the 1990s (and summarized above). This is a most significant conclusion because 
Professor Williamson’s work covers a time span of over 14 years and as such 
provides the most authoritative scientific evidence on what influences truck driver 
behaviour in the area of safety in Australia. 
 
65) With regard to the term of reference relating to the recovery of genuine increases 
in heavy vehicle operating costs (eg fuel levies) Professor Williamson stated that 
the current trip-based or incentive payment system – the predominant method 
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used in relation to both employee and owner/drivers – limits the ability to 
negotiate fair cost recovery. She argued (at page 2) that this type of payment 
system “increases the likelihood that driver payment will be negotiated 
individually with drivers and the likelihood that drivers will be competing for 
work. Both of these offshoots of the per trip payment system increase the 
downward pressure on the amount that drivers are paid for each trip and 
decreases the likelihood that a fair cost recovery is achieved by drivers.”  The 
Review notes other evidence that mechanisms, even when they exist, for passing 
fuel levies operate although the frequency of adjustments varied (from anywhere 
between weekly and six monthly) and a number of owner/drivers and small 
operators stated they had not always received these payments. At a more general 
level, Professor Williamson’s evidence is consistent with the weight of other 
evidence available to the Review. At the same time, the Review would note other 
evidence that suggests it is a combination of the power exercised by some clients, 
intense competition for work, the use of multi-tiered subcontracting (as associated 
cost pressures and subcontractor dependency associated with this), imbalances in 
freight movements as well as the individualized and trip/incentive-based payment 
level that inhibit the capacity to recover increases in operating costs (or operating 
costs more generally on occasion). 
 
66) As noted below, Professor Williamson concluded that her evidence established a 
persuasive case for government intervention on payment systems in the transport 
industry. With regard to the form intervention should take Professor Williamson 
argued, consistent with her findings, that ideally the link between payment and 
output needed to be broken (some operators giving evidence to the Review 
indicated they had moved to hourly pay) and this should be done in conjunction 
with action on the current overall hours limit (which she viewed as excessive). If 
it was not possible to eliminate contingent payment systems altogether Professor 
Williamson argued the most effective regulatory approach would be to set 
minimum freight rates that included additional cost imposts (such as fuel price 
increases). Consistent with other evidence presented to this Review, Professor 
Williamson’s expert opinion was that employee and owner/drivers should be paid 
equivalent rates [that is, net rates] when undertaking the same work. 
 
67) With regard to remuneration and safety Professor Williamson stated (at page 2) 
that there was “very good evidence of a link between driver payment, 
remuneration and safety.”  To support this Professor Williamson referred to the 
findings of surveys she conducted in the 1990s (discussed earlier in this Review) 
linking trip-based payment to fatigue and drug use (ie drivers on trip-based 
payment were two to three times more likely to report stimulant use as drivers 
paid on an hourly/time basis). In addition, Professor Williamson indicated that the 
more recent survey undertaken in 2005 confirmed both stimulant use as an 
ongoing problem and that the factors that promoting it had remained largely 
unchanged. In summing up her findings she observed (at page 3) that while 
“drivers continue to be encouraged to do more trips on the basis that they can 
earn more money, fatigue will continue to be a natural consequence. Stimulant 
drugs will continue to be used in lieu of sleep as they are one of the 
few…strategies available for drivers to stave off fatigue that are effective in the 
longer term.” Professor Williamson also referred to the research of Hensher et al 
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(again discussed earlier in this report) linking payment systems to speeding 
behaviour by truck drivers. 
 
68) One important matter dealt with in Professor Williamson’s verbal submission was 
in relation to the enforcement of awards for employee drivers. Professor 
Williamson’s research in the 1990s as well as that of other researchers (such as 
Arblaster et al) and the NSW Trucking Safety Report (Quinlan, 2001) had 
identified a serious level of non-compliance with award rates amongst long haul 
truck drivers. Contrary to best-practice in enforcement (see Johnstone, 2004) there 
was an over-reliance on complaint-based enforcement rather than proactive and 
strategic enforcement by inspectorates. No evidence presented to this Review 
indicated that this problem has improved in recent years. Indeed, the submissions 
of several industry groups referred to elsewhere in the Review were specifically 
critical of recent changes away from generic industry-based awards, both in terms 
of setting standards and enforceability. The submission of the NSW government 
was also critical of recent developments in federal award structures. Asked about 
award compliance Professor Williamson reinforced these concerns. She indicated 
that the widespread use of trip/kilometer based payment meant that many drivers 
were unaware of their award entitlements and were therefore in no position to 
assert their rights in this regard (problematic in any case due to fear of job loss). 
An effective minimum rates regime for employee drivers (and for owner/drivers 
for that matter) will clearly require adequately resourced and strategic 
enforcement. 
 
69) Concluding her written submission, Professor Williamson observed (at page 4) 
that implementing “safe rates will almost certainly have the effect of increasing 
freight charges. On the other hand, safer payment rates are also likely to improve 
driver retention, improve the attractiveness of the industry to drivers so enhancing 
efforts in recruitment and improve the quality and efficiency of the drivers’ work. 
Drivers who are no longer chronically fatigued and as a consequence focus only 
on getting enough trips done to pay their bills will be much more likely to 
participate actively in their role in the company. Making these changes to 
payment systems will have significant benefits to both safety and efficiency of the 
long distance road transport industry.” 
 
70) The Review was not asked to examine the likely impact of implementing safe 
rates on freight charges more generally. It can be observed that, as Professor 
Williamson, implies the relationship between the setting of safe rates and the 
efficiency and cost of transport services is more complex than a simple translation 
of additional costs to the consumer. Further, there is another side to this coin. As 
researchers in countries like the USA have recognised (see for example, Belzer 
and Christopherson, 2008) transportation costs that are too low can have adverse 
effects on the industry itself, leading to less than optimal business practices as 
well as sub-optimal use of road transport (including over-use that results in 
congestion, accelerated infrastructure costs, pollution and other forms of 
environmental degradation, health hazards and other externalities paid for by the 
community). Consistent with this, the Regulation Impact Statement: Owner 
Driver Regulation in Western Australia (no date) stated (at page 7) that adequate 
levels of remuneration for owner drivers was essential for the long term 
sustainability of operators and the efficient use of road transport more generally. It 
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is only stating the obvious to observe that environmental considerations are 
increasingly impacting on government policy. There is also a ‘level’ playing field 
argument in relation to the regulatory standards and effectiveness of enforcement 
with regard to different industries or sub-sectors that may, to some degree, 
compete for the same business (and to enhance complementarities or inter-modal 
connections). In this regard it is worth noting that the submission of the Rail, 
Tram and Bus Industrial Union argued that in other modes of land transport such 
as rail regulation governing working hours and the enforcement of these and other 
safety laws appeared to be far more stringent (and with higher levels of 
compliance) than appeared to be the case with regard to road transport. Finally, 
any assessment of cost/benefit or regulatory impact has to be seen in the context 
of the significant economic, social and human costs of road related deaths and 
disabling injuries (including flow on costs to families and the community more 
generally). 
 
71) In contrast to the evidence referred to above a number of parties disputed that 
there was a link between remuneration and safety in heavy vehicle transport. The 
same test with regard to supporting evidence was provided in relation to those 
parties who argued there was no relationship between remuneration and OHS 
outcomes. Several large trucking clients indicated they believed there was no 
connection between remuneration and safety but when asked indicated they had 
not specifically investigated this issue. They opposed government intervention, 
one indicating that driver shortages would remedy any discrepancy in rates and 
arguing the issue was best approached in terms of the responsibilities of all 
individuals involved.  In terms of their own response, these clients drew attention 
to their efforts to enhance OHS more generally as well as particular measures to 
reduce trucking waiting times (and related fatigue issues) in 
warehouses/distribution centers, to monitor the OHS performance of transport 
operators or to limit the extent of subcontracting. At a general level reference was 
made to OHS and turnaround times as an important key performance indicator 
(KPI) for distribution center managers (who it was stated did walk-round spot 
checks of compliance). With regard to loading/unloading the large clients 
emphasized that trucking operators were given on-day delivery windows (with 
leeway before and after) at distribution centers and that measures had been taken 
to avoid queues and reduce turn-around times (including the number, location and 
layout of centers as well as the provision of rest/facilities, the use of alert vibrators 
and mobile phones to call up drivers when required).  
 
72) Two large clients of road freight services who made submissions that average turn 
around times had been reduced to about 80 minutes although it was also noted that 
on-time arrival remained a significant problem (one client indicated that less than 
50% of trucks met to arrival windows). Those clients interviewed all denied that 
they used the practice of requiring drivers to phone in to confirm delivery 
windows (thus enabling a change of time) – a practice that drivers that were 
interviewed alleged to be common. Clients interviewed argued that queuing of 
trucks at distribution centres was inefficient and that turnaround times had been 
reduced although a problem for them was trucks arriving well-outside the delivery 
windows (including early). It was also stated that drivers’ service hours were 
checked when they arrived so that suitable arrangements could be made if 
unloading/loading could not occur within the drivers’ allowable hours. Truck 
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drivers who were interviewed were emphatic that delays of several hours or more 
were common (although some of this could have been the result of missing their 
‘slot’). Within the constraints of this Review it impossible to fully reconcile these 
divergent opinions. 
 
73) The two major clients just referred to also indicated that they sought to oversight 
the OHS of trucking operators they engaged, working with medium to large firms 
whose performance could be monitored (and affect future contracts). Both 
included fuel levy adjustment mechanisms in their contracts and indicated they 
preferred longer term contracts with reliable providers rather than the lowest 
possible price. The last point could not be investigated in detail but is not 
consistent with evidence given by transport operators to earlier reviews or with the 
evidence about customer attitudes of most drivers and operators (including 
owner/drivers) given to the current Review (a number of whom referred to 
refusing work or losing contracts from a client to other operators who they 
believed had under-bid/accepted less than sustainable rates). Neither of the major 
clients interviewed by this Review sought information on the rates actually paid to 
subcontractors (or sub-subcontractors and so on) working for the transport 
operators they engaged. One client stated that they sought to limit the number of 
steps or tiers in the subcontracting process but conceded they would only become 
aware of non-compliance with this if an incident occurred involving a 
subcontractor in breach of this. Neither made reference to demurrage confirming 
other evidence that arrangements for demurrage were both rare and seldom 
enforced even where they did exist. 
 
74) A number of other submissions and verbal evidence presented to this Review 
either disputed that there was a demonstrated connection between remuneration 
and safety in trucking (most notably the submissions/evidence of the Australian 
Trucking Association or ATA and Queensland Trucking Association or QTA) or 
while accepting there might be connection argued that it was insignificant or did 
not warrant action to establish safe rates because this was either not feasible 
(points also made the ATA and ARTIO) or that there were superior remedies 
available (notably NatRoads).  
 
75) For example, in its submission (at page 2) the QTA stated that, apart from taxation 
law, the Independent Contractors Act 2006, Owner Driver Contract and Dispute 
Legislation in Victoria and Western Australia and ACCC powers, it rejected 
“intervention into Commercial transactions in the free market, specifically to 
influence payment systems for operators…QTA Ltd suggests no one influence has 
been successful in significantly changing behaviour and road safety 
outcomes…QTA Ltd however supports the right of every operator to secure a 
return on investment and accordingly have access and redress to law which 
prevents exploitation.” The QTA also makes reference to partnered developments 
to enhance safety including intelligence access program, chain of responsibility, 
fatigue/driving-hours reform, national heavy vehicle accreditation programs and 
random roadside drug testing. In a similar vein, the submission of the Chamber of 
Commerce of Western Australia (at page 1) indicated that it didn’t believe pay 
rates for heavy trucks were leading to a decrease in road safety and stated it 
understood most drivers were able to seek full cost recovery in order to meet the 
rising costs of maintaining vehicles. At the same time, the CCI WA stated it 
 38
understood efficiency targets “are also contributing to unsafe work practices.” 
Unlike submissions from a number of other parties (such as Safework South 
Australia), neither the QTA submission nor that of the CCI WA makes reference 
to the extensive evidence of previous inquiries, coronial inquests and court 
decisions into the effect of commercial practices, including payment regimes, on 
safety in the industry. Nor do these submissions cite any independent or 
commissioned research to support their stance.  
 
76) In its written submission the ATA spends page 9 addressing the question as to 
whether payment methods affect safety? Only in the final paragraphs is the actual 
issue of evidence addressed. In this the ATA states “Whilst there have been 
several reports over the past decade that have pointed to an apparent link, these 
have largely been based on unsworn evidence/statements and anecdotal evidence. 
The ATA has not been able to identify any reports that establish any such link 
through empirical evidence that has been rigorously tested. On the surface its 
(sic) may well seem that there is a link or that there may be a link between driver 
payment and safety outcomes and the ATA does not rule this out entirely.  On 
balance, however, the ATA is firmly of the view, based upon wide consultation 
within the industry, including within peak state and sector industry associations 
that collectively represent a substantial and representative proportion of the 
industry of all fleet sizes and operational types, that any such link that may exist is 
not significant. Moreover, the ATA considers that any such link would be more of 
a correlation than a causal link because it would be more about the mindset and 
attitude of individuals concerned than it is about real economic impacts.” This 
Review cannot accept this characterization of the situation as accurate on a 
number of grounds. First, a number of the reports raising this link drew on a 
variety of evidence beyond personal statements and written submissions of 
numerous parties, including in the case of the NSW Trucking Safety Report, a 
structured survey of 300 long haul drivers (Quinlan, 2001). Further, court and 
coronial inquests attesting to this link do contain sworn testimony. Second, 
adopting the ATA’s stance it own ‘extensive consultations’ could be viewed as 
just as anecdotal as numerous statements by owner/drivers, employee drivers, 
government agencies, police, insurers, individual employers and some industry 
association representatives presented to this and previous inquiries. It is worth 
noting that in the course of this Review, persons associated with industry bodies 
such as Paul Freestone and Frank Black put a very different perspective. Third, 
and perhaps most importantly there is rigorous research attesting that reward 
systems in trucking are not only associated with safety outcomes but that this 
association is significant. Much of this research pertains to the Australian trucking 
industry and has been available (and growing) since the early 1990s, including the 
work of Hensher et al and Ann Williamson and her colleagues (a number of other 
studies are referred to in this Review). A number of these studies (including 
Hensher and Williamson) were carried out for road transport agencies and were 
peer reviewed as part of this.  Several were subsequently published in peer-review 
international scientific journals, presented to international conference proceedings 
or other scientific publications. Further, there is international research also making 
this link, most notably but not exclusively the work of Professor Belzer in the 
USA. In its oral presentation ATA representatives referred to Professor Belzer’s 
research and this is discussed below.  
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77) One argument raised by the ATA and a number of other parties (see also written 
submission of NatRoads) was that a leading reason for a rates 
squeeze/unsustainability amongst owner/drivers and small operators was poor 
business practices. It was contended that a mandated safety rate should not be 
used to ‘reward’ inefficient business practices and rather these practices needed to 
be addressed. The problem of poor business practices by owner/operators has been 
identified by earlier reviews, which noted the relative ease with which a new 
operator could enter the industry (without the necessary skills to run a business) 
and money could be borrowed to purchase a truck (for a summary see Quinlan, 
2001). In its written submission (at pages 7-8), discussing the industry’s capacity 
to negotiate fair cost recovery, the ATA indicated that there were varying views 
and different bargaining positions affected by industry sector and size. The ATA 
pointed to the development of readily available business models as well as Chain 
of Responsibility (COR) and Driving Hours and Fatigue Management (DHFM) 
laws as leading to an improvement in the situation even for owner/drivers.   
 
a) Without denying poor business practices are an issue (and one where 
successive recommendations that may have addressed this have not been 
effective or implemented [in the case of operator licensing]) this problem 
needs to be seen in context. Evidence presented to this Review and earlier 
reviews (see extensive evidence on freight rates in Quinlan, 2001) suggests 
that client pressure on freight rates, poor margins (even amongst larger 
operators) and the use of subcontracting chains to reduce costs affects the 
business practices of even highly experienced owner/operators and not simply 
new entrants lacking skills. Asked about the number of experienced small 
operators complaining about their current circumstances ATA representatives 
contended that even poor business operators could survive 10-15 years. The 
Review finds this hard to accept and in any case a number of the operators 
complaining about the pressure from the current level of remuneration had 
successfully run their business for over 20 years. Only one of those 
interviewed fitted the scenario of an operator who had made a poor business 
decision (and this, it was alleged, was based on assurances about the amount 
and price of subcontracted work from a large transport operator). Further, a 
number of those interviewed had no major encumbrances in terms of new 
truck repayments. 
  
b) The Review also found that, contrary to the poor business explanation, 
owner/operators were able to provide a detailed breakdown of their cost 
structure and both the operational and capital cost recovery-based level of 
remuneration needed to service this. Finally, a number of owner/operators 
were emphatic that when they sought to request an increase in rates they were 
told if they didn’t like the rates they could go elsewhere. Others stated that 
promises made about return trips evaporated on arrival at the first destination 
or made reference to under-bidding on contracts. In such a competitive 
industry (the submission of NatRoads indicated there estimated to be 49,000 
businesses directly in the freight hire and reward sector – the vast majority 
very small - not counting competition from in-house and other modes of 
transport) the power imbalance of small operators gives them little bargaining 
power. It is worth noting that submission of the NSW government indicates (at 
page 24) that recognition of the imbalance of bargaining power of 
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owner/drivers was the impetus for setting a framework of minimum rates even 
though these drivers were not employees. 
 
c) The submission of NatRoads acknowledged (at page 3) that competitive 
pressures were a key driver in the industry and that other factors hampering 
cost recovery (in addition to poor business practices) had to be acknowledged 
including administrative difficulties in keeping up with cost fluctuations; some 
reluctance to pass on full costs for fear of losing work; and concerns about 
maintaining commercial viability that were “often validated with clients 
moving to different transport operators or in the case of certain export 
markets goods being unviable due to increased transport costs.”  
 
d) The poor business model does not really explain why major transport 
operators choose to subcontract so much work unless the industry explicitly 
recognizes and relies on uneconomic subcontractors to subsidise unsustainable 
rates. In sum, while poor business practices may be a problem, for many 
operators it appears that the pressure from low rates is conducive to poor 
business practices not vice versa. 
  
78) Another argument raised by the ATA queried the connection between poor rates 
and cost cutting in relation to vehicle repair and maintenance, by noting that 
investigation by police revealed that a lack of roadworthiness accounted for only a 
small proportion of crashes (around 3% was the figure cited). Whether this figure 
is really low (accepting the figure cited) or an acceptable level of non-compliance 
for commercial road transport are both moot points. While the Review was unable 
to explore this issue in detail it would make the following observations. Vehicle 
failure has been responsible for some extremely serious incidents. For example, 
the failure of brakes on a semi-trailer on the Mooney Mooney Bridge (on the main 
freeway north of Sydney) in October 2004 resulted in a pile up involving 34 other 
vehicles and the death of a woman driving one of the cars involved (Sydney 
Morning Herald  23 October 2004). Heavy vehicle crashes commonly result from 
multiple causes (for example the combination of speed, fatigue, road/traffic 
conditions as well as maintenance issues) and these causes are not always fully 
investigated (for detailed evidence on this see Perrone, 2000) so it is entirely 
possible if not probable that maintenance/repair problems have contributed to 
crashes beyond the figure just cited. Further, crashes investigated and reported to 
police are likely to represent only the tip of an ice-berg of incidents or OHS 
related effects of poor vehicle maintenance. Finally, leaving this all to one side it 
needs to be noted that the research of Hensher et al and Williamson et al discussed 
above demonstrates that economic and reward pressures can result in variety of 
unsafe driver behaviour (not simply cost cutting on maintenance) including 
speeding and excessive hours/inadequate breaks/driving whilst fatigued. To this 
list might be added overloading. Other evidence discussed above (such as that of 
WorkSafe Victoria) reinforces this point. In sum, more detailed investigation into 
the causes of heavy crashes is required but available evidence indicates economic 
and reward pressures are associated with a spectrum of unsafe work practices and 
adverse OHS outcomes that warrant concern and action. 
 
79) Representatives of the ATA also made the point that since Belzer’s study of pay 
and safety in the US trucking industry was confined to single company it was not 
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clear whether the safety gains of improving pay could be extended to the entire 
industry since it may simply be based on retention of a limited pool of more 
experienced and competent drivers. The limitations with company-specific studies 
are acknowledged (and indeed identified by Belzer) although this was a very large 
company. It should also be noted that the company study was only one of three 
data sets and studies within the overall report submitted to the Transportation 
Research Board by Belzer and his colleagues (Rodriguez et al 2003).  Another 
data set involved a cross-section of more than 100 nonunion TL carriers. This data 
set showed the same relationship, including the effect of unpaid labor, and was 
highly significant across all compensation variables.  The third and final data set 
involved analysis of a truck driver survey also yielded consistent results including 
the same significance with respect to the variables. A number of additional points 
can be made. First, the studies of Hensher and Williamson et al and a number of 
others (eg Mayhew and Quinlan, 2006) were not company specific and so this 
limitation does not apply to the Australian research linking remuneration systems 
and safety. Second, the ATA’s point indirectly raises another important question, 
namely the shortage of drivers in the trucking industry. Selection effects cannot be 
considered in isolation of the capacity to obtain workers in an industry more 
generally. Indeed, one of the major issues confronting the trucking industry in 
both Australia and other countries such as the USA is a shortage of drivers – a 
point made by many submissions and verbal presentations to this Review. The 
truck-driver workforce in Australia is ageing - something well reflected in 
interviews conducted for this Review where only one driver was under thirty years 
of age and the vast majority of drivers were aged in their fifties or sixties. 
 
80) Irrespective of company specific effects, labour shortages and an ageing 
workforce are unlikely to be conducive to higher levels of health and safety in the 
industry because they limit the capacity of many employers (not just some) to be 
selective in recruitment and retention policies; makes it more difficult to manage 
labour turnover (there is a well-recognised connection between short job tenure 
and OHS problems, see Breslin and Smith, 2006); and leads to workloads that 
discourage changes in work arrangements to suit health/wellbeing and long-term 
workforce participation of older drivers. While labour shortages in an industry 
where minimum rates of remuneration (to both owner/drivers and employee 
drivers) are an issue may seem paradoxical to the laws of supply and demand the 
situation is not unique to Australia (for study of the USA see Belzer, 2000), 
reflecting structural features of the industry and, arguably, the unattractiveness of 
working conditions.  
 
a) Many employee and owner/drivers who spoke to the Review referred to the 
long hours, low remuneration/financial strain and poor work/life balance 
(especially time spent with family – notwithstanding the efforts of some 
companies to address this with staged driving and the like. These are 
conditions hardly likely to attract new and younger workers to the industry – 
something that may become more critical given population decline in country 
towns (a traditional source of recruitment due to limited alternative 
employment opportunities). Indeed, these very points were articulated by older 
drivers to explain why their children would not opt for the same occupation as 
well as the only driver under 30 years of age that was interviewed (who 
indicated that those of his age group were discouraged by the long hours). As 
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noted elsewhere in the Review, a number of submissions from owner/drivers 
indicated that the combination of poor returns, escalating costs and more 
stringent laws and penalties was causing long term operators to decide to leave 
the industry. 
 
b) While long hours (up to 72 hours per week) are taken for granted in the long 
haul trucking industry (and long hours are also a feature of short haul trucking, 
see Williamson et al, forthcoming) these are exceptional when compared to 
most other industries. Unlike mining, remuneration does not appear 
commensurate to these hours. Although detailed exploration of this issue 
could not be undertaken by this Review, it is at least arguable that making the 
heavy vehicle industry more attractive (in terms of pay and hours) would 
address both labour shortages and enhance OHS outcomes in the longer term. 
It is an important issue that warrants consideration. With regard to this Review 
it is sufficient to note that reference to ‘selection’ effects in terms of safety 
outcomes does not itself address a range of broader considerations about 
workforce changes confronting the industry.  
 
c) Consistent with a number of the points just made, Professor Williamson also 
expressed the view that safe rates could enhance the capacity of operators to 
secure and retain better and more actively involved drivers with long term 
safety and efficiency benefits to the industry. This is consistent with the views 
of a number of US researchers who have argued that a number of safety 
benefits flow from increased retention rates (including better training regimes, 
enhanced organisational safety culture) and these would effect multiple 
companies if not the industry more generally (See Short et al, 2007:14). 
 
81) In its written submission (at pages 8-9) the ATA acknowledged contentions about 
the safety enhancement that could flow from safe rates enabling better recruitment 
and selection. The ATA indicated it didn’t accept this view, stating that the award 
system set legal minimum rates for which the compliance rate was high, and that 
there was nothing stopping employers from paying higher rates to attract and 
retain good drivers. The Review has already identified submissions from other 
industry associations pointing to problems with the current award arrangements. It 
also received evidence in relation to problems with compliance (such as Professor 
Williamson and the TWU) which is consistent with findings of earlier inquiries 
(Quinlan, 2001). The third argument does not address the issue of competitive 
pressures on transport operators, extensive references to which can be found 
elsewhere in this report. 
 
82) As already noted, the submissions of several parties to the Review argued that, 
irrespective of any purported connection between remuneration and safety, the 
most effective means of addressing OHS problems in the industry was through 
means other than setting ‘safe rates’. There were a number of points made in 
support of these contentions, each of which will be addressed in turn. 
 
83) First, it was argued that the setting of safe rates was not feasible or practical.  
Several different points were raised in connection with this.  
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a) Several parties queried what the term ‘safe rates’ meant (see for example the 
submissions of the VTA and NatRoads). This was not seen to be problematic 
by the vast majority of those making a submission to the Review. The tenor of 
these submissions was that safe rates represented a level that enabled operators 
and those they employed to secure a return sufficient as not to encourage 
hazardous driving practices or other compromises with regard to safety. For 
example, responding to the query as to what rates had to do with fatigue and 
breached, Jerry Brown-Sarre (CEO of the Australian Long Distance Owners & 
Drivers Association) stated (at page 3) “simply, it is the amount of money left 
over after all costs per trip that either forces an owner driver or driver, to 
have rest, do maintenance on the vehicle or make him compelled to work 
harder and longer putting himself or others at risk.” An independently 
audited safety performance benchmarking tool could be used to assist in the 
formulation of safe rates (such a tool has been developed in the USA – see 
http://www.ilir.umich.edu/TIBP/ under the “Safety Performance”). 
 
b)  A number of difficulties were raised about the setting of safe rates in relation 
to owner/drivers by the VTA/ARTIO. The VTA/ARTIO submissions did not 
see a problem in relation to employee drivers, stating it supported a strong 
industry-based award system (though noting problems in relation to incentives 
and paid rates awards created by the federal WorkChoices legislation). It 
preferred a return to this model. However, in relation to owner-drivers the both 
the VTA and ARTIO identified a number of problems including how to 
address differences in the nature of freight tasks, differences in rates due to the 
imbalance in freight movements between some centres, differences tax 
concessions available to different firm structures (eg corporate status), how to 
account for differences in the model, age and cost of equipment (notably 
trucks and trailers), and how to effectively enforce any rates regime. The ATA 
submission (at page 4) also pointed to the highly variable nature of freight 
tasks, providing the example of 100 tonnes of dry goods, 100 tonnes of 
dangerous goods and a 100 tonne indivisible load. Owner/drivers were also 
asked about their views about the difficulties in setting minimum safe rates. 
Interviews indicated that many worked under a relatively restricted range of 
kilometer/tonnage based payment regimes or single trip prices for standard 
trips that were in many circumstances well-known. A number of owner/drivers 
interviewed by the Review were dismissive about some of the alleged 
complexities arguing that the costs of undertaking trips on most major routes 
were already well-known and others could be readily calculated. Further, it 
was noted that while newer trucks posed greater costs in terms of repayments 
and insurance older trucks cost more to maintain and operate and access to tax 
concessions for depreciation also needed to be acknowledged. The Review 
accepts that heavy vehicle freight covers a range of tasks but does not believe 
the complexity is such as to make the setting of an effective safety rate regime 
impossible. Clearly, a range of rates would be needed (along with agreed 
costing formulas to deal with special or contingent cases). Rates could also be 
determined for more specialized areas of activity as is already the case in the 
short haul sector. Owner/drivers in the short haul sector described to the 
Review in some detail how the contract determination system worked and how 
adjustments were made both to deal with particular subsectors as well as a 
regular review process. If such a process can work in the short haul sector 
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there seems no logical reason why a system of safety-based rates could not be 
determined federally (particularly if those involved in making these decisions 
had suitable expertise in the industry, rate fixing processes and safety). A 
number of issues regarding the mechanics of establishing and enforcing a 
system of minimum rate setting are dealt with in later sections of this report. 
 
c) As an alternative to mandating minimum rates for owner drivers the VTA 
pointed to a tribunal structure that that established rates as a standard or 
guidance rather than as a binding requirement (the ARTF/TWU Interstate 
Owner/Driver Tribunal). The rates established by this body (latest rates to 
apply from September 2008) include agreed costing models and adjustment 
mechanisms in relation to fuel prices. If such a workable structure is possible 
on an advisory basis the question needs to be asked as to why such a rates 
structure is not viewed as possible on a mandatory basis. 
 
d) Reference was also made during the course of the Review to the Victorian 
Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors Act, 2005 that sought to address the 
exploitation of owner/drivers. The VTA saw this as a model that could be 
adopted nationally. The Victorian Act requires that contracts must be in 
writing and specify rates and minimum hours of work, prohibited the 
deduction of costs without permission, specified a minimum period of notice 
for contract termination and included a right to mediation in the case of 
disputes (see complaints about verbal contracts by owner/drivers earlier in this 
report). The Act was also incorporates a model contract for owner/drivers and 
the Department and Victorian Transport Industry Council also produced code 
of conduct and information booklets as well as rates/costs schedules to assist 
owner/drivers. The Review was informed that cases referred to mediation had 
an 83% success rate in terms of resolution. Cases that could not be resolved at 
this level could be referred to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
(it was indicated one case had been concluded and two other cases had been 
certified to proceed to this level). It should be noted that several other 
jurisdictions (such as New South Wales) have had unconscionable contract 
provisions applying to truck drivers for many years in their industrial relations 
legislation (this option is not available in Victoria which ceded its industrial 
relations powers to the Commonwealth). There is also provision for action 
under the federal Independent Contractors Act, 2006 (but note criticisms of 
the limitations of this in the submission of Safework South Australia referred 
to above). With regard to the Victorian legislation and contract provisions in 
other jurisdictions the Review would make a number of points. First, to the 
extent they are enforced elements of the Victorian legislation (such as those 
relating to written contacts) have value. Second, mechanisms for resolving 
disputes or dealing with unconscionable contracts in Victorian and other state 
legislation have value (it is arguable that the NSW approach is superior). 
Nonetheless, mechanisms for disputing contracts place the onus on individual 
owner/drivers – an unknown number of which may decide not pursue a 
complaint due to time and resource constraints (even where these are 
relatively small) or due to fears of blacklisting and loss of future work. 
Interviews with owner/drivers indicated these were real concerns. Further, 
individual or even small group complaints are unlikely to affect broader issues 
of rates amongst owner/drivers. Third, following from the last point the 
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Victorian legislation addresses the issue of what are acceptable minimum rates 
in an individual and voluntary/non-mandatory fashion (ie it is up to the 
aggrieved owner/driver to take action). Providing better information to 
owner/drivers does not address the often fundamental bargaining power 
imbalance between owner/drivers and those engaging them. As such, it fails to 
address the problem at the centre of this Review and nor was any evidence 
presented to this Review that indicated it had resulted in substantial changes in 
rates paid to owner/drivers.  
 
e) Taking the above arguments into consideration, this Review would make the 
following observations. As previous inquiries have indicated (Quinlan, 2001) 
attempts to set minimum rates for owner/drivers on a voluntary or consensual 
basis, while they may exert some influence, have repeatedly failed since the 
late 1970s because they lacked the capacity to ensure meaningful coverage 
and compliance (inevitably breaking down under competitive pressure). In 
several jurisdictions (most notably New South Wales) longstanding awards 
and contract determinations covering employee and owner/drivers respectively 
in the short haul sector (covering a diverse array of transport activities from 
refrigerated transport to courier services) demonstrate that such a mechanism 
is both feasible and enforceable. 
 
f) It might also be suggested that trip or kilometer-based payment, even if does 
compromise safety, will be difficult to change because it is attractive to drivers 
to enhance their earnings and to operators (including owner/drivers) because it 
boosts productivity and spreads the risk (for example the negative impact on 
productivity was a concern raised in the submission of the Australian Logistics 
Council at page 4). Setting of safe rates doesn’t preclude maintenance of the 
trip or kilometer-based payment system and the moral hazard argument is 
addressed elsewhere. At the same time, trip-based payment (without 
demurrage) fails to penalize inefficient use of transport by clients. Incentives 
could be revised to utilize in-truck technology to secure better efficiency and 
safety outcomes (with regard to speed, fuel economy, braking behaviour etc). 
Some operators (generally medium to large firms) have already moved in this 
direction (and examples of this were presented to the Review). However, far 
from precluding a safety-rate these observations simply indicate that even with 
such rates, more than sufficient basis for competitive efficiencies will exist in 
the industry and be exploited by some operators. However, the pursuit of these 
will not compromise safety and clients will still be able to select more efficient 
operators. 
 
g) Yet another argument (see submission of NatRoads at page 4) was that a safe 
rates regime could have the unintended consequence of resulting in a shift 
away from the use of owner/drivers. The mix in use of owner/drivers and 
employee drivers may indeed change although the precise effect can only be 
suggested and are unlikely to be as immediate or profound as implied. Further, 
it is difficult to reconcile this concern with repeated statements from 
owner/drivers themselves that existing rates were unsustainable and that many 
were contemplating leaving the industry (see evidence above) or the 
widespread acknowledgement of a driver recruitment/retention problem. It 
seems unlikely owner/drivers would urge a measure that would lead to their 
 46
extinction. Consistent with this sentiment, the Regulation Impact Statement: 
Owner Driver Regulation in Western Australia (no date) stated (at page 7) that 
increasing the earnings of owner/drivers was necessary to ensure the long term 
sustainability of the industry because low rates discouraged new entrants and 
the capacity of existing operators to invest in more productive equipment.  The 
Review acknowledges there is a need to ensure there are matching levels of 
rate protection and enforcement with regard to both owner and employee 
drivers. Evidence of various parties, including medium-sized operators, to the 
Review indicated that there would always be an ongoing need for 
owner/drivers to meet fluctuations in task-load, niche services, combining 
several smaller tasks from different clients and the like. For small transport 
firms, the use of owner/drivers provides a means of cutting their capital costs 
and spreading business risks. While the mix of owner/drivers and employee 
drivers may change over time (this will be influenced by a variety of factors 
not least of which will be the desire for and relative attractiveness of 
owner/operator and employee driver status) it seems very unlikely that the 
former will not continue to be an important part of the industry as they have 
been for many years. Again, the experience of contract determinations for 
short haul drivers in NSW clearly indicates that this did not lead to the 
disappearance of owner/drivers. 
 
h) In sum, while the implementation of a safety rate regime covering owner 
drivers and employee drivers will involve some challenges and complexities 
this Review finds no evidence such difficulties, either individually or in 
combination, are sufficient to indicate that a workable solution cannot be 
reached. Indeed, there are already successful models that demonstrate a 
workable outcome is eminently achievable. 
 
84) The submission of the Australian Logistics Council (at page 4) identified a 
number of potential benefits of safe rates including certainty of income for 
employee and owner/drivers; preventing undercutting of rates to unsafe and 
unsustainable levels in a competitive market; increased compliance with fatigue 
and speed regulations; customers unable to use bargaining power to drive rates to 
unsafe levels; and demurrage payments would encourage more efficient 
distribution systems. The Council also identified potential disadvantages including 
lack of flexibility; adverse productivity effects; doesn’t directly address unsafe 
practices; may be difficult to enforce. The flexibility and productivity arguments 
were addressed above. In relation to the other potential disadvantages the evidence 
available to this Review indicates that far from being an indirect intervention 
addressing rates represents a more direct approach to the source of unsafe 
practices that many if not most other regulatory interventions. Economic or 
commercial pressure is not tangential to safety in road transport, it occupies a key 
position. With regard to enforcement it also arguable that addressing causal issues 
is more likely to succeed than enforcement directed at symptoms. Again, the 
operation of contract determinations covering short haul drivers for many years in 
at least one jurisdiction indicates that enforcement can be secured. This Review 
recognises the need for more strategic and active enforcement in relation to 
employee drivers, and recommendations are made in this regard. 
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85) Second, it could be argued that the setting of minimum safe rates would simply 
result in drivers working the same hours in order to enhance their income – the 
moral hazard argument developed by economists. The Review does not find this 
argument persuasive on a number of grounds. This interpretation is not consistent 
with the evidence – as distinct from a priori reasoning – of research undertaken by 
Hensher, Belzer and others that has already been referred to in this report. Nor is it 
consistent with the submissions of drivers (both employee and owner/operator) to 
this Review (or previous reviews such as Quinlan, 2001 for that matter) about the 
poor work/life balance they experience and their desire to spend more time with 
their families. Further, to the extent that some drivers did follow such a path this 
minority could be targeted by enforcement agencies in the knowledge that there 
was no economic necessity under-pinning such behaviour. Finally, the moral 
hazard argument doesn’t address a number of areas of safety concern that were 
raised in connection to poor remuneration, including cost-cutting on truck 
maintenance, servicing and repair. 
 
86) Third, it was argued that attention should focus on fatigue management especially 
in the context of the recent national initiative in this regard. It was suggested that 
the effectiveness of this measure should be given time before further interventions 
were considered (a rather similar argument about recent fatigue management 
initiatives was made in submissions to the NSW Trucking Safety Inquiry in 2000). 
While accepting the importance of recent national initiatives on heavy vehicle 
fatigue management this Review has concerns about viewing this regime as an 
alternative to addressing remuneration and safety issue.  
 
a) This approach risks a focus on treating symptoms rather than underlying 
causes (see the research of Hensher et al and Williamson et al already referred 
to). In her submission Professor Ann Williamson addressed the issue of 
whether government should intervene on payment systems. She stated (at page 
4) that the first survey undertaken of fatigue amongst truck drivers in the early 
1990s “we pointed out that driver payment systems were incompatible with 
good fatigue management and consequently needed to be reviewed. Over the 
intervening 15 years there has been no change to the way drivers are paid. 
Clearly leaving the industry to address this issue has not been successful. As a 
consequence, therefore, it is essential that the government takes a role to 
intervene to make payment systems for long distance truck drivers more 
compatible with safety.” Professor Williamson believed that despite, the view 
of the industry that it was achieving success through new fatigue laws and 
fatigue management regimes, these still permitted hours of work that she 
regarded as excessive. 
 
b) Further, consistent with the previous point a number of operators making 
submissions to this Review (including those systematically implementing 
enhanced fatigue management regimes such as Rocky’s Own Transport) 
indicated that they were only able to do this in the context of securing better 
freight rate outcomes (and foregoing some existing clients who refused to pay 
higher rates). While it might be argued that the new fatigue management 
regime will lead to changes in freight rates to accommodate new work 
practices this seems a brave assumption in the context of the past history of the 
industry. Those operators who achieved the change appeared to have been able 
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to carve out a niche market (such as the movement of explosives) that 
insulated them to some degree under-bidding by less scrupulous operators. As 
indicated above small operators and owner/drivers interviewed by the Review 
overwhelmingly indicated that attempts to secure better rates were generally 
rebuffed and they lacked the bargaining power to influence outcomes (ie they 
were price takers) or the financial resources to keep refusing work until a 
better contract was located. Operators in this position face a difficult choice 
well summarised by the submission of one owner/driver (Frank Black at page 
1). After noting that while most owner and employee drivers he talked to tried 
“hard to operate within the law” but at times felt obliged it break it in order to 
survive, Mr Black stated that many operators with more than 25 years 
experience were considering leaving the industry due to new laws/heavier 
penalties and the inability to financially survive. 
 
c) Despite substantial evidence attesting to its ineffectiveness (summarised in 
Quinlan, 2001) the logbook system remains a pivotal element in tracking 
hours of work in the industry. Evidence presented to this Review from a range 
of parties, including drivers themselves, reinforced these earlier observations 
about inadequacies in the logbook regime in terms of widespread/systemic 
breaches and the like. Drivers openly admitted that they falsified logbooks and 
did so under pressure to complete tasks within schedules or to reach a 
necessary level of earnings under trip or kilometer-based pay to meet their 
financial commitments. Professor Williamson stated there was a need for a 
more trackable system of recording working hours and one that didn’t place 
responsibility entirely with the driver to create the record. She believed freight 
forwarders and others were clearly aware that driving hours were being 
breached and that a new mechanism which would tie in their responsibility 
needed to be created if more than lip service was to be paid to chain of 
responsibility. With regard to this it is worth noting that prosecutions 
extending beyond drivers and operators to freight forwarders and clients 
remain almost if not entirely unknown with regard to all aspects of chain of 
responsibility laws. 
 
d) Overall, the weight of evidence from this Review and previous research and 
inquiries casts severe doubt that a new national fatigue regime – the effective 
enforcement of which remains to be proved – will of itself rectify this 
situation. It should not be viewed as an alternative to intervention on 
remuneration/pay but rather the two should be seen as complementary. 
 
87) Fourth, reference was made to various other schemes affecting heavy vehicle 
safety such as the ATA’s Trucksafe Scheme and the Heavy Vehicle Accreditation 
scheme. These schemes have existed for some time. They were examined in detail 
by the NSW Tracking Safety Report (Quinlan, 2001) where it was found that, 
while not with effect, voluntary schemes lacked the coverage and influence to 
bring about an overall change in safety-related work practices in the trucking 
industry. At the time of the NSW Report, Trucksafe had around 350 members out 
of around 30,000 for-hire freight operators in long haul transport. The ATA 
indicated that the scheme now has around 400 members, and while this includes 
many large operators, it is still by no means setting a pervasive benchmark for the 
industry. As in the NSW 2000 Report this Review heard some conflicting 
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evidence about the effectiveness of the Trucksafe logo in terms of safe work 
practices. The Review was in no position to evaluate this evidence. Nonetheless, 
in the absence of compelling evidence that Trucksafe and other schemes have 
secured a change a safety culture within the industry as whole this Review 
remains unconvinced by the argument these schemes are an alternative. While 
beneficial voluntary schemes by their very nature lack the coverage and 
mandatory force to secure change amongst all operators. In a highly competitive 
industry like commercial trucking there will always be pressures for operators to 
dip below acceptable or legal levels of safe behaviour and once even a small 
number of operators have done this the pressure will flow on to other operators via 
freight rates and remunerations systems that discourage safe work practices. 
 
88) Fifth, another point raised by ATA representatives was the safety performance of 
the industry (as measured by the incidence of fatal crashes and crash fatalities 
involving heavy vehicles) had improved over time when considered in the context 
of the growth of the overall freight task. This could be viewed as an argument 
against the need for any additional intervention measures. Essentially the same 
argument was presented to the NSW Trucking Safety Review which, however 
noted, that the major improvement had occurred in the early 1990s following 
regulatory responses to a serious of disastrous incidents; the improvement did not 
match that secured in relation to other vehicles; and that, while important, crashes 
are not the only important indicator of OHS performance (Quinlan, 2001). It is not 
clear that these counterpoints have changed significantly in the past seven years 
(apart from an improvement in the indexed number of fatal crashes involving 
articulated trucks between 2002 and 2007, Department of Infrastructure, 
Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, 2008). Further, as is the 
case with measuring productivity changes, crash statistics trends need to take 
account changes in the number and size/configuration of trucks, including the 
growing use of larger vehicles such as B-Doubles (Boyer and Burks, 2007). Most 
importantly perhaps, such aggregated data cannot be viewed as an endorsement of 
existing practices, the contribution of which to this outcome is unclear. 
 
Overall findings on the relationship between pay and safety in heavy vehicles  
 
89) This Review finds that the overwhelming weight of evidence indicates that 
commercial/industrial practices affecting road transport play a direct and 
significant role in causing hazardous practices. There is solid survey evidence 
linking payment levels and systems to crashes, speeding, driving while fatigued 
and drug use. This evidence has been accepted and indeed confirmed by 
government inquiries, coronial inquests, courts and industrial tribunal hearings in 
Australia over a number of years. The association between remuneration and 
safety applies to both employed and owner/drivers. The Review was also told by 
owner/drivers and small operators that inadequate remuneration had obliged them 
to cut back on costs relating to the maintenance and repair of their vehicles. The 
extent and safety implications of this are unknown but the practice is disturbing. A 
number of government OHS agencies (Safework Victoria and Safework South 
Australia) also indicated that they believed remuneration was an important safety 
factor in the trucking industry, with Safework Victoria providing the Review with 
recent focus group research undertaken in the industry that attested to this link. 
Unfortunately, while there is evidence linking remuneration and safety in the 
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Australian heavy vehicle industry for over 15 years this connection has been 
largely ignored by policy-makers and regulators (and not, for example factored 
into multi-causal investigation of serious truck crashes by road transport 
authorities, despite evidence from court proceedings and coronial inquests). Major 
stakeholders in the industry continue to deny there is a connection, while 
essentially proffering little if any research or credible evidence to discount or 
provide alternative explanations to research indicating that such a connection 
exists. Thus, for example, the findings of Professors Hensher and Williamson 
have been largely ignored, even though they are also consistent with what 
owner/drivers and employee drivers told this Review and previous inquiries (not 
to mention the submissions of the TWU). 
 
90) With regard to the term of reference relating to the recovery of genuine increases 
in heavy vehicle operating costs the Review found that a combination of the 
power exercised by some clients, intense competition for work, the use of multi-
tiered subcontracting (as associated cost pressures and subcontractor dependency 
associated with this), imbalances in freight movements as well as the 
individualized and trip/incentive-based payment level inhibits the capacity to 
recover increases in operating costs (or operating costs more generally on 
occasion). 
 
91) Since employee and owner/drivers perform the same tasks (and are 
interchangeable) both need to be covered by a minimum safe rates regime. In the 
past, in the long haul sector minimum award protection applied to employed 
drivers but no protection was afforded to owner/drivers. In the context of fierce 
competition amongst operators and cost containment pressures from often large 
and powerful clients the result has been extensive use of subcontracting and 
owner/drivers at reduced and arguably often unsustainable rates that has in turn 
placed pressure on the payment system of employed drivers (leading to extensive 
use of trip/kilometer-based rates and widespread problems of compliance with 
awards/agreements, especially amongst smaller operators. Again, the findings of 
this Review confirmed earlier research and inquiries (see Williamson et al 2000 
and Quinlan, 2001). 
 
92) Until such time as these issues are addressed there was unlikely to be any 
significant improvement in safety performance across the industry. At the very 
least, addressing these issues are an integral element in achieving an effective 
package of policy intervention. Setting minimum rates for both employee and 
owner/drivers (albeit using different mechanisms) would be, in the view of this 
Review, an important and necessary step in this direction. The regime covering 
owner/drivers needs to be mandated. As previous inquiries have indicated 
(Quinlan, 2001) attempts to set minimum rates for owner/drivers on a voluntary 
basis have repeatedly failed since the late 1970s because they lacked the capacity 
to ensure meaningful coverage and compliance (inevitably breaking down under 
competitive pressure). Even with the best business practices, owner/drivers are 
often in no position to bargain effectively with more powerful parties and 
evidence suggests community and driver safety is the loser from such an 
imbalance. In several jurisdictions (most notably New South Wales) longstanding 
awards and contract determinations covering employee and owner/drivers 
respectively in the short haul sector (covering a diverse array of transport 
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activities from refrigerated transport to courier services) demonstrate that such a 
mechanism is feasible. 
 
93) In the view of this Review the evidence indicates that the transport industry will 
remain intensely competitive even following the setting of minimum rates for 
owner/drivers and more vigorous implementation of employee driver entitlements. 
Transport operators will still have a strong incentive to provide a cost effective 
service by making astute use of market niches, technology (such as GPS) and 
other operational efficiencies (a number of which were identified in this report as 
illustrative of other evidence made available in this regard). However, the setting 
of minimum rates will mean that the incentive to cut labour costs and engage in 
work practices that compromise safety will be removed as a basis for competitive 
advantage. As several submissions to this Review argued, this type of competition 
imposes heavy and unacceptable costs on the industry and the Australian 
community at large. A final consideration is that the industry is already 
experiencing labour shortages, something that will be compounded by a rapidly 
ageing workforce. The Review endorses Professor Williamson’s view that the 
setting of safe rates will make the industry more attractive to potential workers 
and will aid the building of a more sustainable, effective and safer workforce in 
the future. 
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TERMS OF REFERENCE 2, 5 AND 6 
 
94) In this part of our report we deal with the Terms of Reference numbered 2, 5 and 
6.  Those Terms of Reference, in summary, deal with, in the context of the issue 
of “safe payments”, the scope of existing regulatory models for employees and 
owner/drivers in the transport industry; the concurrent use of employees and 
owner/drivers in the industry, including consideration of existing regulatory 
models in other jurisdictions (other than the Commonwealth jurisdiction) with the 
capacity to deal concurrently with both employees and owner/drivers; payment 
methods and remuneration; identification of means by which Commonwealth 
schemes could deal with a system of “safe rates” for employees and 
owner/drivers, should that be appropriate, and any gaps in the current regulatory 
approach 
 
Current Legislative Frameworks 
 
95) The Terms of Reference require us to consider the scope of existing regulatory 
models in the transport industry.  The NTC has usefully provided a document 
entitled “Current Legislative Frameworks”, the content of which has been checked 
by the NTC with relevant state, territory and federal authorities.  A copy of that 
document is included as Appendix 2. 
 
96) The first part of this Review concluded that there is a clear relationship between 
remuneration and safety in the heavy vehicle road transport industry and that the 
recent enactment of the fatigue regulations will not be sufficient to result in the 
situation where it can be said that there are safe payment and/or remuneration 
systems for drivers in the industry. 
 
97) Consideration of the current legislative frameworks indicates that they do not 
successfully or adequately address the present issue. There is no issue that the 
safety problems identified in the inquiry apply equally to employees and 
owner/drivers in the industry who relevantly perform the same work. Indeed there 
are many references in the material provided to us to both categories operating in 
” a single market” (a proposition with which we agree). 
 
98) However, the current frameworks deal separately with employee/drivers and 
owner/drivers.  Employee/drivers are dealt with by a variety of federal and state 
industrial awards, in the case of state instruments apparently covering both long 
haul and short haul drivers (importantly the NSW Government has indicated it has 
concerns about the current federal award modernisation process and the awards 
resulting from the process particularly as to how effectively in the context of this 
Inquiry the resulting award(s) will assist or maintain safety in the transport 
industry).  
 
99) As to owner/drivers, there is a marked difference between the various regimes.  
There are no specific regulatory systems that deal with owner/drivers in 
Queensland, South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern 
Territory and Tasmania.  New South Wales has had a long history of regulation of 
owner/drivers since the 1960s but under the legislation there is (significantly) no 
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scope for liability for breaches of contract determinations to be imposed on 
anyone other than principal contractors and owner/drivers.   
 
100) In 2005 the State of Victoria enacted the Owners Drivers and Forestry 
Contractors Act to regulate the contractual dealings between owner/drivers and 
hirers and freight brokers.  This legislation resulted from recommendations made 
by an Inquiry into Independent Contractors which found that owner/drivers were 
vulnerable due to their lack of negotiating power and this led to lower rates of pay 
creating a tendency among owner/drivers to speed, drive while fatigued, drive 
overloaded vehicles and generally to breach the road laws in order to revenue 
efficiencies in pay and conditions.  As the document provided to us by the NTC 
shows: 
 
“The Act applies to three defined parties; hirers, owner-drivers and freight 
brokers. The threshold requirements for the Act to apply to an owner-driver 
are that the owner must not own more than three vehicles and must also be the 
driver of one of the vehicles. Owner-drivers can operate under a range of 
business models such as sole-traders, non-public corporations and 
partnerships.  
 
The legislation creates a framework that has three components. First, it 
introduces a range of requirements on those hiring owner-drivers. These 
obligations require hirers and freight brokers to provide owner-drivers with 
information booklets (these contain an overview of the legal framework 
regulating owner drivers, rates and cost schedules, dispute resolution 
processes, practical business information and safety laws and regulations) 
within strict timelines, negotiate with agents acting on behalf of owner-drivers 
and not to act unconscionably when contracting. The legislation also imposes 
contracting and termination requirements.  
 
Second, the Act creates a range of administrative structures and processes. 
These deal with a range of areas from the production and status of certain 
documents (i.e. information booklets and codes of practice) to the creation of 
a Transport Industry Council to advise and make recommendations to the 
Minister for Industrial Relations and a dedicated dispute resolution process 
involving the Small Business Commissioner and the Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal (VCAT).  
 
Third, the Act provides owner drivers with certain rights, such as the ability to 
appoint and negotiate through an agent and protections, such as the 
prohibition of unconscionable conduct. Note however, that freight brokers and 
hirers are also provided with certain rights, such as the ability to appoint 
agents...”   
 
101) As earlier noted The Victorian Act requires that contracts must be in writing 
and specify rates and minimum hours of work, prohibits the deduction of costs 
without permission and specifies a minimum period of notice for contract 
termination. 
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102) Both the VTA and the ARTIO made detailed submissions generally in support 
of the systems operating in Victoria. Specifically they contended that there should 
be: 
 
(a) a strong award based system to determine terms and conditions for 
employees drivers. 
(b) acknowledgement of the well recognised mechanism for developing rates 
for interstate owner drivers through the ARTF/TWU tribunal which could 
form the basis for a more formal model with the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission (AIRC) as the appropriate body to administer this. 
(c) continuation of state systems of owner driver regulation that reflect the 
culture and traditions applying and well accepted across the industry. 
 
103) Notwithstanding the important step taken in Victoria, and as earlier noted, it 
does not address the often fundamental bargaining power imbalance between 
owner/drivers and those engaging them. As such, it fails to address the problem at 
the centre of this Review; nor was any evidence presented to the Review that 
indicated it had resulted in substantial changes in rates paid to owner/drivers. The 
VTA and the ARTIO approach does not sufficiently recognize these shortcomings 
or the changing nature of the award systems referred to by the NSW Government. 
 
104) Safework South Australia’s submission is that there are still significant 
obstacles to addressing the nexus between unsafe remuneration levels and poor 
safety practices in the road freight industry. Reduction in fatigue for long distance 
road truck drivers will only be achieved if the current performance based payment 
systems in the industry are reformed. Fatigue laws are a crucial precondition to 
achieving safety outcomes; however, without measures to address the current 
remuneration structure, there will still be major economic incentives for truck 
drivers to engage in unsafe work practices. Such economic incentives towards 
unsafe work practices operate throughout the entire road freight industry. 
 
105) In canvassing a range of options Safework South Australia suggests a tribunal 
structure, perhaps based on current federal legislation (the Workplace Relations 
Act and the Independent Contractors Act) with power to make determinations 
applying to conditions and contracts under transport workers (including owner-
drivers) work, providing for “safe” rates and methods of remuneration. 
 
106) The NSW Government’s contention is that questions of the present nature are 
best dealt with by an independent statutory tribunal with broad powers and that 
the best available model for such a regulatory arrangement is the NSW Industrial 
Relations Commission including the powers available to it under Chapter 6 of the 
NSW Industrial Relations Act 1996 such as  the power to make contract 
determinations (analogous to awards), and to approve contract agreements 
(analogous to enterprise agreements) between parties in the transport industry and 
the power to resolve disputes in the Industry. The NSW Government urges the 
National Transport Commission to recommend the adoption of national legislative 
provisions based on the NSW legislation that would need to be put in place by 
means of cooperation with State Governments. 
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107) Parenthetically, we should emphasise that there was no submission before us 
which sought that owner/drivers be treated as if they were employees or that there 
should be some mechanism to deem owner/drivers to be employees as is currently 
found in Queensland legislation. 
 
108) The submissions of many representatives of head contractors, employers, and 
industry clients of such companies, counseled or warned against the introduction 
of forms of regulation in the industry. Many of those were coupled with the view 
that there was no, or no necessary, relationship between rates and safety (an 
approach we have rejected) while others seem to reject such a proposal 
irrespective of the conclusions reached on the safety issue (see, for example, the 
submissions of Tothag Transport Group, ATA NSW, CCI of WA, ATA, QTA, 
Woolworths and Coles). A number of the submissions rely heavily on the 
existence of different sectors in the transport industry to submit that it would not 
be possible to deal with such differing sectors in the same instrument or the same 
framework. 
 
109) Once it is accepted there is a clear relationship between remuneration and 
safety in the road traffic industry that has existed for many years, and which is not 
being adequately addressed, it would not only be unacceptable but perverse to fail 
to recommend appropriate rectification. Different parts of the industry would 
inevitably be dealt with differently by the mechanism we recommend. Many other 
of the concerns raised would be met by the specialist nature of the proposed 
mechanism, which would not be part of any generalist system and would be 
staffed by personnel with relevant industry expertise (with the expertise 
undoubtedly speedily growing). 
 
110) Of the various submissions before us concerning these Terms of Reference the 
most detailed and specific is that of the TWU.  For example, paragraphs 37 to 76 
of the TWU submission deal with the issue of existing schemes of regulation; 
paragraphs 77 to 82 deal with what the TWU sees as the relevant “regulatory 
gaps”; and paragraphs 83 to 97 set out the TWU’s proposals and options 
concerning the legislative provisions that should be adopted to cure the 
“regulatory gaps” in the industry. 
 
111) The TWU submission, before setting out the detail of the two options it 
proposes indicates in paragraph 83 that the purpose of the relevant part of its 
submissions is to identify the means by which the Commonwealth could legislate 
to achieve the policy objectives set out in that paragraph. Paragraphs 84 to 86 then 
set out in summary form the nature of the two options proposed (in the following 
terms): 
 
84. Two options are identified by which these objectives may be achieved. 
The first option involves the amendment of existing legislative regimes 
applying to employee truck drivers and truck owners drivers, namely the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and the Independent Contractors Act 
1996 (Cth) respectively.  The first option involves the utilisation of existing 
structures and institutions (in particular, the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission) to achieve the policy objectives. 
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83. The second option would involve the enactment of a discrete piece of 
legislation, and the creation of new structures and institutions (in 
particular, the creation of a new tribunal specific to the road transport 
industry) in order to achieve the policy objectives. Some consequential 
amendments to the Workplace Relations Act would be necessary.  
 
86. In each case, because of the current lack of publicly available 
information as to the detail of how the Commonwealth Government 
intends to legislatively implement its Forward with Fairness industrial 
relations policy, and because of the urgency of this matter, these proposals 
have been prepared by reference to the Workplace Relations Act and the 
Independent Contractors Act in their current form.  In each case it is 
envisaged that the proposals will operate seamlessly with road transport 
laws. [paragraphs 84 to 86.] 
 
112) The first option put forward by the TWU, in summary, proposes that 
amendments be made, in the case of employees, to the Workplace Relations Act 
and to the Independent Contractors Act, in the case of owner/drivers.  Paragraphs 
87 to 89 set out option one and because of their importance, we set them out in 
full: 
 
Option One 
Employees 
87. The amendments required to be made to the Workplace Relations Act 
to effect the legislative objectives with respect to employed truck drivers 
are relatively straightforward.  In summary, it is proposed that the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission would be empowered, in the 
case of “modern awards” which have application to employed truck 
drivers, to make and, at regular intervals, review award provisions 
concerning the matters identified in paragraphs 80(i)-(iv) above. 
 
88. The specific changes to the Workplace Relations Act would be as 
follows: 
 
(i) A new provision would be inserted into Part 10A Division 3 
Subdivision A which, in respect of employed truck drivers, would prescribe 
the following matters additional to those in s 576J: 
 
(a) such terms relating to the conditions under which an employer may 
employ transport workers to ensure their health and safety  (including 
terms relating to the pay and conditions of employed truck drivers and the 
planning of the performance of their work in a safe and legal fashion); and 
 
(b) such terms relating to the conditions under which an “eligible entity” 
(as defined in s 564) may arrange for road transport work to be carried 
out for the entity (either directly or indirectly) by transport workers which 
are necessary to ensure their health and safety (including terms relating to 
the pay and conditions of employed truck drivers and the planning of the 
performance of their work in a safe and legal fashion). 
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(ii) A new provision similar to s 576V(5) permitting a modern award to 
apply, in addition to relevant employers, employees and organisations, an 
“eligible entity” or an employer that operates in the road transport 
industry or in respect of which a term made in accordance with the new 
provisions identified in paragraph 86(i) above are expressed to apply. 
 
(iii) A variation to s 576H to permit the AIRC to vary modern awards in 
order that any new provisions of the type identified in paragraph 86(i) 
above remain relevant in the light of any changed circumstances. Such 
power could be exercised by the AIRC acting on its own initiative or upon 
the application of an organisation bound by the relevant modern awards. 
 
Owner Drivers  
89. With respect to owner drivers, it is proposed that a new part be 
inserted into the Independent Contractors Act empowering the AIRC to 
made determinations applying to contracts under which owner drivers 
work providing for the matters identified in paragraphs 80(i)-(iv) above.  
Specifically, it is proposed that the new part would: 
 
(i) apply to any “services contract”, as defined in s 5 and of a type to 
which Part 3 of the Act applies in accordance with s 11, where the 
relevant services supplied are road transport services involving the use of 
a motor vehicle operated by the independent contractor; 
 
(ii) confer power upon the AIRC to make a determination with respect to 
the remuneration of the independent contractor, and any condition, under 
such a services contract or class of such services contracts, and with 
respect to the termination of any such services contract; 
 
(iii)additionally, confer power upon the AIRC to make a determination 
with respect to the conditions under which an eligible entity (defined in the 
same terms as in s 564 of the Workplace Relations Act, except that the 
words “other than in the entity's capacity as an employer” would be 
replaced with “other than in the entity’s capacity as one engaging an 
independent contractor working under a services contract”) may arrange 
for road transport to be carried out for the entity (either directly or 
indirectly) by an independent contractor working under such a services 
contract; 
 
(iv) provide that such a determination may be made by the AIRC acting on 
its own initiative or upon the application of any organisation registered 
under the Workplace Relations Act which has as members independent 
contractors bound by any such services contracts; 
 
(v) apply the provisions of the Workplace Relations concerning the 
AIRC’s procedures, including but not limited to its procedures with 
respect to the conduct of hearings, appeals, representation and costs, to 
the AIRC’s exercise of its powers under the new part of the Independent 
Contractors Act; 
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(vi) provide for enforcement procedures for determinations made by the 
AIRC that are relevantly the same as for awards under the Workplace 
Relations Act. [paragraphs 87 to 89, together with appropriate 
headings.] 
 
113) The second option put forward by the TWU involves the creation of a new 
legislative regime, separate from the Workplace Relations Act and the 
Independent Contractors Act, with the new legislative regime applying 
specifically to transport workers and owner/drivers, although the new Act would 
need to interact to a degree with, certainly, the Workplace Relations Act and, 
perhaps, the Independent Contractors Act.  Again, because of its relevant detail, 
we set out the relevant paragraphs of the TWU’s submissions in full: 
 
Option Two 
90. The second option involves the creation of a new legislative regime, 
separate from the Workplace Relations Act and the Independent 
Contractors Act, to apply specifically to transport workers and owner-
drivers.  However, with respect to employees, the new Act would need to 
interact to a degree with the Workplace Relations Act.  The constitutional 
foundations for the new Act would be the same as for the Workplace 
Relations Act and the Independent Contractors Act.  Thus, in order to 
establish the requisite constitutional connection, the new Act would, with 
respect to employment relationships, utilise the same definitions of 
“employee”, “employer” and “eligible entity” as contained in the 
Workplace Relations Act (see ss 5, 6 and 564), and with respect to 
independent contractors, it would utilise the definition of “services 
contract” in s 5 of the Independent Contractors Act (with such a services 
contract also being subject to restrictions the same as those contained in s 
11 of the Independent Contractors Act and involving the performance by 
the independent contractor of road transport services involving the use of 
a motor vehicle operated by the independent contractor) and the modified 
definition of “eligible entity” referred to in paragraph 87(iii) above. 
 
91. The new Act would require the establishment of a new tribunal to 
carry out the functions which, under the first option, are to be carried out 
by the AIRC. However, there would be no reason why appropriate 
personnel from the AIRC could not be dually appointed to the Tribunal, 
with the Australian Industrial Registry and other AIRC facilities used to 
support the Tribunal. This would render negligible any cost associated 
with the establishment of the Tribunal. It is envisaged that the Tribunal 
would consist of a President and two Deputy Presidents, all part-time, who 
would jointly exercise the Tribunal’s powers.  The new Act would make 
provision for the procedures of the new Tribunal, including as to the 
conduct of hearings, representation and costs, that are the same as 
applying to the AIRC under the Workplace Relations Act.  The new 
Tribunal would be able to exercise its powers and functions on its own 
initiative or upon the application of any organisation registered under the 
Workplace Relations Act having as members employed truck drivers, 
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employers of truck drivers, or independent contractors bound by services 
contracts. 
 
92. The functions and powers of the new Tribunal would be as follows:  
 
(i) to make award provisions applying to employed truck drivers, 
employers and eligible entities relating to: 
 
(a) the conditions under which an employer may employ transport workers 
which are necessary to ensure their health and safety (including terms 
relating to the pay and conditions of employed truck drivers and the 
planning of the performance of their work in a safe and legal fashion); and 
 
(b) the conditions under which an eligible entity may arrange for road 
transport work to be carried out for the entity (either directly or indirectly) 
by transport workers which are necessary to ensure their health and safety 
(including terms relating to the pay and conditions of employed truck 
drivers and the planning of the performance of their work in a safe and 
legal fashion); and 
 
(ii) to make determinations applying to independent contractors, entities 
engaging independent contractors, and eligible entities (with the modified 
definition referred to in paragraph 87(iii) above) with respect to:  
 
(a) the remuneration of an independent contractor, and any condition, 
under a services contract or class of such services contracts, and the 
termination of any such services contract; and 
 
(b) the conditions under which an eligible entity may arrange for road 
transport to be carried out for the entity (either directly or indirectly) by 
an independent contractor working under a services contract. 
 
93. Any award provisions made by the new Tribunal as per paragraph 
90(i) would be taken to be provisions of modern awards applicable to road 
transport for the purposes of the Workplace Relations Act, and would be 
enforceable under the award enforcement provisions of that Act.  The new 
Act would also provide for enforcement procedures for determinations 
made by the new Tribunal as per paragraph 90(ii) above that are 
relevantly the same as for awards under the Workplace Relations Act. 
 Conclusion – The Need To Act 
92. The TWUA has provided evidence that attests to the severe crisis in 
safety that is currently plaguing the transport industry.  In 2007, this crisis 
claimed 235 people’s lives in articulated heavy vehicle and rigid heavy 
vehicle incidents.  Each road death costs $1.7 million.  Each injury in an 
incident costs $408 000 . When the non monetised social impact of road 
deaths, injuries and illness, family breakdown, pain and suffering is 
included in the measurement of what road deaths and injuries cost the 
community, the need for regulatory intervention is obvious. 
93. The TWUA has demonstrated how Judicial and coronial 
determinations, academic studies, and government-commissioned have 
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recognised that the foundation of this regulatory intervention must be full 
and proper recognition of the relationship between methods for the 
remuneration of drivers and the poor safety practices that imperil the 
transport industry. These practices include drivers being subject to the 
pressure to work excessive hours; the pressure to exceed legal speed 
limits; the pressure to drive through break and sleep times; and, in some 
circumstances, the professional use of illegal stimulants to combat fatigue. 
[paragraphs 90 to 93 of the TWU submissions.] 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
114) The Review recommends that a national scheme for setting mandatory safe 
rates covering both employee and owner/drivers be established in the heavy 
vehicle industry. This is the only viable and direct mechanism for addressing the 
imbalance in bargaining power confronting owner/drivers that affects safety in the 
road freight industry. 
115) In principle, there then are three possible options open for consideration as 
appropriate reforms in the light of that recommendation. First, legislative deeming 
of owner/drivers as employees and subsequent regulation of their conditions by an 
industrial tribunal. Second, amendments to the Workplace Relations Act  and the 
Independent Contractors Act and the conferral of power on the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission to determine conditions for both employee 
drivers and owner/drivers (broadly TWU option 1). Third, creation of a 
specialized body under federal transport legislation with wide powers to fix rates 
of remuneration and related matters which ensure industry safety. 
116) The first option has received no support in the Review. No party has argued 
for it. Many owner/drivers would oppose this option and we consider that their 
choice should be respected. The second option faces many practical difficulties 
which are discussed below. We consider that the third option, having regard to all 
the evidence and submissions before us, represents a solution that balances the 
respective interests of the industry stakeholders and pays due regard to the public 
interest considerations involved in achieving a safer road transport industry. 
 
117) We conclude that a clear case has been demonstrated for a form of regulation 
to be established in the context of the chain of responsibility to ensure that rates of 
pay and other elements of remuneration in the long haul transport industry may be 
determined to provide for safe rates, conditions and remuneration. We also 
conclude that whatever form of regulation is decided upon, it must be a dynamic 
form of regulation.  Dynamic in two senses: dynamic in the sense that it is capable 
of dealing speedily to changes in the industry which could be considered as 
detrimental to the existence of rates of pay which maintain safety in the industry; 
and dynamic also in the sense that the system is capable, to the extent necessary, 
of fixing different rates of pay and remuneration for different sectors of the 
industry. 
 
118) We have also concluded that there is considerable public interest in such a 
form of regulation being in place.  The major, but certainly not the only, public 
interest element of this issue is the important effect it has on road safety which, of 
course, has an actual or potential effect on every member of the community. 
 
119) In general terms, we favour certain aspects of the second option proposed by 
the TWU.  We do not consider that the first option is appropriate for a number of 
reasons which include the uncertainty of the future of the AIRC in terms of the 
government’s proposals which have been promulgated under the rubric of 
“Forward with Fairness” under which, inter alia, the AIRC is likely to be replaced 
by a body to be known as Fair Work Australia and the consideration that the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) does not have significant 
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experience in respect of independent contractors generally or owner/drivers 
specifically. If the concerns of the NSW Government earlier are valid the relevant 
federal body would eventually have less expertise than at present. These 
considerations have also lead us not to accept certain of the aspects of the 
proposals made by Safework South Australia and the NSW Government. 
 
120) We also conclude that the new body should be established under specific 
transport legislation because the prime basis and rationale for its existence will be 
the important issue of road safety and because such a specialist body will be more 
likely to allay or lessen industry concerns as to the undesirability of regulation. 
Necessary consequential amendments to other federal legislation (such as the 
Workplace Relations Act and the Independent Contractors Act) should be made. 
 
121) It is considered that a specific and specialised tribunal should be established 
and although certain elements of the structure of the new tribunal may well be 
appropriate for government policy decision (issues such as whether it be a single 
member tribunal or a multi member tribunal, although we favour the latter), it is 
essential that the personnel of the tribunal have extensive experience in the 
transport industry; industrial relations (certainly in the fixation of rates of 
payment); and/or occupational health and safety.  These qualifications by way of 
experience would be in addition to any other kind of qualification or the holding 
of office which government policy might determine; for example, legal 
qualifications; membership of an existing federal or state tribunal or court; 
accounting experience or experience in small business. 
 
122) The terms of reference include identification of means by which 
Commonwealth schemes could deal with a system of “safe rates” for employees 
and owner/drivers, should that be appropriate. Power for federal laws to be made 
to deal with principals, intermediaries, agents or employers in the chain of 
responsibility in the transport industry, to the extent that that they are 
constitutional corporations (for example, trading or financial corporations) is now 
clear. The High Court of Australia in its 2006 judgment in the Workchoices case 
(New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1; [2006] HCA 52); held, 
inter alia, at [267] that 
 
“The essential operation of the provisions under immediate consideration is 
that the employment relationship between certain constitutional corporations 
and their employees shall be regulated according to certain terms and 
conditions whose content is to be found in identified forms of instrument and 
whose content may be adjusted in the ways prescribed by the new Act. That is 
a law with respect to constitutional corporations.” 
 
123) Indeed, it is arguable that the judgment of the High Court provides power to 
the Commonwealth to enact legislation for all entities or persons in the chain of 
responsibility if the “highest” entity in the chain is a constitutional corporation. 
Plainly, however, for reasons of certainty in operation, it would be preferable for 
there to be also counterpart state legislation. 
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124) Finally we make a make a number of more minor recommendations. Reference 
has been earlier made to the Victorian requirement for written contracts. The 
Tasmanian Forest Contractors Association (TFCA) also submits that ‘plain English 
style contracts’ should be mandated, even to the point of developing proformas. 
“The more complex document, the more difficult it is for operators to understand 
and problems arise when rates are discussed. Within some transport contracts in 
Tasmania that TFCA is familiar with, the fuel adjustment mechanisms alone are 
some three pages long and difficult to interpret without legal advice”. 
 
125) We recommend finally that legislative provision should be made to require all 
contracts pertaining to employees and owner/drivers in the industry be in writing 
and in ‘plain English style’. No doubt proformas would be developed, probably 
from documentation already in use in the industry. 
 
126) As noted earlier in the Review, compliance with minimum rates for both 
owner/drivers (where voluntary agreements have hitherto prevailed apart from 
contract determinations pertaining to short haul drivers in NSW) and employee 
drivers (covered by awards/agreements) has proved problematic especially in the 
long haul sector of the industry. Failure to pay even legally mandated entitlements 
has been shown by previous inquiries to be a direct consequence of the same 
commercial pressures that compromise safety. To facilitate effective 
implementation of a safe rate regime this Review would make the following 
recommendations. 
 
a) That it be made mandatory for every heavy vehicle to carry information 
pertaining to the payment level and rate for that trip/s currently being 
undertaken at its compliance with the relevant safe rates pertaining to either 
the employee or owner/driver involved. Copies of these records are to be kept 
by the operator (where this is not the owner/driver of the vehicle), principal 
contractor and client.  
b) This information is to be provided to any accredited government authority 
(police, road transport or OHS) or their representative upon demand. A duly-
accredited official of an industrial organisation should also be empowered to 
request this information. 
c) If payment is not made by the party that immediately engaged the driver 
(within a specified time period of not more than two weeks) in the case of an 
owner/driver) there should be a rebuttable presumption that responsibility for 
making restitution rests with the principal contractor in any multi-tiered 
subcontracting arrangement. 
d) Matching penalties shall apply for the failure to pay safe rates to employee or 
owner/drivers with escalating penalties for repeated offences or systemic 
evasion of legal requirements. 
e) Enforcement measures to ensure compliance with safe rates for both employee 
and owner drivers needs to be adequately resourced, proactive (not simply 
complaint driven) and strategic (see for example, Johnstone 2004). The 
success of enforcement regimes in relation to OHS provides a model of how to 
secure this. 
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Appendix 2: Current legislative frameworks 
 
National reforms 
Over the past 15 years the NTC together with commonwealth, state and territory 
governments has undertaken the development of a suite of road transport laws reforms 
aimed at addressing un safe on-road behaviours and introducing the concept of ‘chain 
of responsibility’. These reforms have included:  
• Heavy Vehicle Driver Fatigue;  
• Mass and Overloading;  
• Speeding;  
• Compliance and Enforcement;  
• Dangerous Goods; 
• Restricted Access Vehicles; and   
• Intelligent Access Program.  
The NTC, in conjunction with the commonwealth, state and territory governments, 
has undertaken the development and drafting of national model legislation. Each 
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jurisdiction is then expected to implement that legislation to achieve the goal of 
nationally consistent road transport legislation in relation to heavy vehicles.  
 
Chain of responsibility  
The NTC has developed and applied the Chain of Responsibility principle to many 
areas of road transport reform. This concept extends liability for breaches of road 
transport law to all parties who influence the road transport task. A primary concern 
of road regulators and governments has been that breaches of road transport laws 
occur due to the interactions of a number of parties in the supply chain, rather than 
just the behaviour of the driver of the vehicle or its operator.  
 
Chain of responsibility legislation dealing with four areas of road transport activity 
(specifically dangerous goods, mass, dimension and load restraint, fatigue and 
speeding) requires that each party in the chain takes reasonable steps to ensure that 
breaches of the road law do not occur. One of the advantages of chain of 
responsibility is that it overcomes traditional issues with apportioning criminal 
liability to supply chain parties who have either been outside the scope of prosecution 
or have contracted out of their obligations. It achieves this by extending the scope of 
liability to those parties who, through action or inaction, contributed to the breach and 
therefore bear a level of responsibility for it.     
 
In recent chain of responsibility legislation (fatigue and speeding), new restrictions 
have been introduced to deal with requests and contracts or agreements dealing with 
service or loading. These restrictions deal with requests and contracts or agreements 
that may encourage or, due to the way in which they operate, require the breaching of 
driving hours or speed limits. The legislation prohibits such requests and contracts or 
agreements.   
 
The effect of the chain of responsibility prohibitions on requests, contracts or 
agreements has ramifications on those parties who engage drivers for transport 
purposes. In those situations, contracts or agreements that require, or in effect result 
in, an owner-driver or employee breaching speeding or fatigue laws, are considered 
prohibited and liability extends to the party or parties who contracted with the driver.  
 
In addition, other chain of responsibility legislation such as dangerous goods and 
mass, dimension and load restraint, also have an impact on employees and owner-
drivers. Although they don’t expressly deal with or regulate contractual relationships, 
they implicitly do so because of the operation of chain of responsibility and the 
requirement for all chain parties to take reasonable steps.  
 
Dangerous goods  
In the National Transport Commission (Model Legislation — Transport of Dangerous 
Goods by Road or Rail) Regulations 2007 and the National Transport Commission 
(Road Transport Legislation – Dangerous Goods Regulations) Regulations 2006, the 
responsibilities of each of the parties in the dangerous goods transport chain are 
defined by drawing a distinction between the primary liability of the person 
responsible for ensuring that a particular requirement is met, and the secondary 
liability of a person who is responsible only to the extent that he or she knew, or 
reasonably ought to have known, that the obligation was not fulfilled.  
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Under the Dangerous Goods chain of responsibility, packers, loaders, manufacturers, 
consignors, prime contractors and drivers have defined legal responsibilities that 
correspond to their respective duties in the loading and transport of dangerous goods. 
The extent of their liability (primary or secondary) reflects the extent of their control 
over these duties. 
Compliance and enforcement legislation  
The National Transport Commission (Road Transport Legislation — Compliance and 
Enforcement Bill) Regulations 2006 targets compliance rather than simple 
enforcement issues. Its objectives are to rectify identified inadequacies in the areas of 
enforcement powers and evidentiary requirements and introduce new sanctions and 
responsibilities for those involved in road transport.  
In order to achieve these objectives, the Bill creates a general framework for 
compliance and enforcement activities, outlines the chain of responsibility concept, 
introduces stronger enforcement powers and provides a range of innovative sanctions, 
penalties and evidentiary provisions.  
Furthermore, a three-part classification of breaches, defined according to the degree 
of risk involved (comprising of minor, substantial and severe risk breaches) is created 
and thresholds are imposed for each category of risk. 
The Bill deals specifically with the duties and liability of consignors, packers, loaders, 
vehicle operators and receivers as well as drivers. In addition, directors and senior 
managers of corporations involved in the use and operation of heavy vehicles are also 
subject to liability for breaches of the road law. Parties in the supply chain are given a 
reasonable steps defence.  
There are specific enforcement powers available in respect of each category of 
offence (i.e., minor risk, substantial risk and severe risk offences) and the powers 
become stronger in proportion to escalating risk.  
The legislation also imposes requirements for the provision of accurate container 
weight declarations and the liability of the various parties in respect of these 
declarations.  
Mass, dimension and load restraint  
The National Transport Commission (Road Transport Legislation — Compliance and 
Enforcement Bill) Regulations 2006 contains specific offence provisions relating to 
mass, dimension and load restraint issues which have a detrimental impact on-road 
safety and infrastructure. Parties identified in the mass dimension and load restraint 
chain of responsibility include consignors, loaders, carriers, drivers, packers, receivers 
and directors and senior managers of bodies corporate.  
Breaches of mass, dimension and load restraint are characterised according to the risk 
involved and thresholds are specified in terms of a combination of absolute values, 
percentage values and where the breach involves load restraint, more subjective 
criteria. 
Consignors of goods, loaders, operators and drivers are all guilty of an absolute 
liability offence where a breach of a mass, dimension or load restraint requirement 
occurs, but each of these groups has available to it a ‘reasonable steps’ defence. 
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However, the defence in its application to operators and drivers is limited to minor 
risk mass, dimension and load restraint breaches.  
Consignees of goods may also be liable for mass, dimension and load restraint 
breaches if they intentionally, recklessly or negligently induce or reward the 
commission of such breaches. 
Heavy vehicle driver fatigue  
The National Transport Commission (Model Legislation — Heavy Vehicle Driver 
Fatigue) Regulations 2007 requires all parties in the supply chain, not just the driver, 
to take reasonable steps to ensure drivers are able to comply with the legal work/rest 
hours.  
Parties in the fatigue chain of responsibility include the driver, the employer of a 
driver, the prime contractor of a driver, the operator of a vehicle, the scheduler of 
goods or passengers for transport by the vehicle and also the scheduler of its driver, 
both the consignor and consignee of the goods transported by the vehicle, the loading 
manager, and the loader and unloader of the goods carried by the vehicle.  
As discussed in previous chapters the new fatigue laws do create some obligations on 
chain parties not to enter into contracts which would encourage drivers to drive while 
fatigued.  
Speeding  
The National Transport Commission (Model Act on Heavy Vehicle Speeding 
Compliance) Regulations 2008 creates a chain of responsibility for speed compliance.  
Chain of responsibility provisions for speed compliance deal with those parties who 
are in a position to influence a decision to breach speed limits. Parties in this chain are 
required to actively consider whether what they are doing, for example scheduling, 
loading etc, will require a driver to speed.  
Specific duties and offences apply to employers, prime contractors, operators, 
schedulers, loading managers, consignors and consignees. These parties are required 
to take reasonable steps to ensure that their conduct does not cause the driver to 
exceed speed limits.  
Additionally, the model legislation forbids requests, agreements and contracts that 
may result in a heavy vehicle driver exceeding the speed limit. 
 
State regulatory systems 
Only states that have specific regulatory systems which impact on owner-drivers have 
been addressed in this section. Those other jurisdictions: Queensland, South Australia, 
Northern Territory and Tasmania do not have any currently operating system to 
support owner-drivers.  
 
Australian Capital Territory 
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) has at present no regulatory framework for 
owner-drivers. However, in 2004, Katy Gallagher MLA, Minister for Industrial 
Affairs, tabled the Fair Work Contract Bill 2004 in the ACT. The Bill has not since 
progressed. The Bill is based on the Victorian and Western Australian legislation, and 
is grounded in a combination of commercial and industrial relations law.    
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New South Wales 
The regulation of owner-drivers has been long established in New South Wales 
(NSW) for over 30 years. The regulatory framework is based on the recommendations 
of a Commission of Inquiry undertaken in the 1960s. The Commission of Inquiry 
found that owner-drivers were vulnerable due to their working arrangements and were 
therefore likely to be exploited by others within the transport industry. Subsequently, 
the regulation of contracts of bailment and contracts of carriage came to be covered 
under Chapter 6 Industrial Relations Act 1996.  
 
The Industrial Relations Act 1996 under Chapter 6 regulates contracts between 
owner-drivers and principal contractors. Importantly, the Act doesn’t apply to those 
transport companies that are independent and in the commercial position to enter into 
commercial arrangements with a number of parties. Rather, it applies to single vehicle 
owner-drivers who lack the ability to independently contract with several parties.  It 
provides for cost recovery rates of pay across a variety of transport sectors, vehicle 
classes and vehicle ages (contract determinations), while at the same time permitting 
arrangements to provide enterprise specific incentives. Under the Act, the under-
cutting of prices is prevented but incentives for owner-drivers above the minimum 
standards set by the Act are allowed. There are a number of protections for owner-
drivers. These include protections against the arbitrary termination of a contract, and 
the capacity to recover goodwill in cases involving termination of the contract that 
result in the goodwill being extinguished unfairly. The Industrial Relations 
Commission resolves disputes between owner-drivers and principal contractors, and 
gives enforceable effect to industry or sector arrangements in contract determinations.  
 
The legislation also allows for contract agreements, which are arrangements dealing 
with terms and conditions specific to a particular enterprise. These agreements can be 
entered into by transport operators and groups of owner-drivers, owner-drivers can 
request their union representative to represent them, and there are currently a range of 
such agreements dealing with specific enterprises across a full range of transport 
sectors such as waste collection, car carriers, breweries etc. Note however, that under 
the legislation there is no ability to impose liability on anyone for breaches of contract 
determinations other than principal contractors and owner-drivers.  
 
Victoria 
The Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors Act 2005 (the Act) regulates the 
contractual dealings between contractors (owner drivers) and hirers and freight 
brokers. The legislation was a result of recommendations made by the Victorian 
Report of Inquiry: Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors February 2005 which 
found that owner drivers were vulnerable due to their lack of negotiating power and 
this led to lower rates of pay creating a tendency among owner drivers to speed, drive 
while fatigued, drive overloaded vehicles and generally to breach the road laws in 
order to remedy deficiencies in pay and conditions.  
 
The legal areas underpinning the Act involve a mixture of industrial relations, trade 
practices and consumer/small business law. This approach is based on a view of 
owner-drivers as small business operators but sharing many of the characteristics of 
employee drivers. 
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The Act applies to three defined parties: hirers, owner-drivers and freight brokers. The 
threshold requirements for the Act to apply to an owner-driver are that the owner must 
not own more than three vehicles and must also be the driver of one of the vehicles. 
Owner-drivers can operate under a range of business models such as sole traders, non-
public corporations and partnerships.  
 
The legislation creates a framework that has three components. First, it introduces a 
range of requirements on those hiring owner-drivers. These obligations require hirers 
and freight brokers to provide owner-drivers with information booklets (these contain 
an overview of the legal framework regulating owner drivers, rates and cost 
schedules, dispute resolution processes, practical business information and safety laws 
and regulations) within strict timelines, negotiate with agents acting on behalf of 
owner-drivers and not to act unconscionably when contracting. The legislation also 
imposes contracting and termination requirements.  
 
Second, the Act creates a range of administrative structures and processes. These deal 
with a range of areas from the production and status of certain documents (i.e. 
information booklets and codes of practice) to the creation of a Transport Industry 
Council to advise and make recommendations to the Minister for Industrial Relations 
and a dedicated dispute resolution process involving the Small Business 
Commissioner and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT).  
 
Third, the Act provides owner drivers with certain rights, such as the ability to appoint 
and negotiate through an agent, and protections, such as the prohibition of 
unconscionable conduct. Note however, that freight brokers and hirers are also 
provided with certain rights, such as the ability to appoint agents. Further, all the 
parties to whom the Act applies are restricted from subjecting any person to detriment 
because that person has or wishes to exercise a right available under the Act.   
 
Western Australia 
In Western Australia (WA), the Owner Driver (Contracts and Disputes) Act 2007 (the 
Act) regulates a number of supply chain parties. The Act is based on the Victorian 
Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors Act 2005. It is intended to deal with the 
same issues that led to the development of the Victorian legislation, specifically road 
safety concerns due to excessive competition within the trucking industry. The 
objective of the legislation is to provide owner-drivers with sustainable guideline rates 
and a practical framework through which they can negotiate with hirers on a 
collective basis. The legislative framework covers owner-drivers contracts and applies 
to owner-drivers and prime contractors who are engaged in the transportation of 
freight within Western Australia, even if the contract has been entered into outside of 
the state. However, the legislation does not apply to owner-drivers who are covered 
by similar legislation in NSW or Victoria.  
 
The legislation specifically provides owner-drivers with security of payment, 
establishes a Road Freight Transport Industry Council with one of its tasks to develop 
the Code of Conduct that includes guideline rates and other provisions regulating the 
relationship between the parties. The Act also includes a conciliation and arbitration 
mechanism, under the Road Freight Transport Industry Tribunal, which can hear 
disputes between the parties regarding breaches of contracts, the Code of Conduct and 
breaches of the security of payment provisions. Owner-drivers are allowed to appoint 
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bargaining agents (union or other) so as to negotiate collectively, and the legislation 
prohibits unconscionable conduct. Due to the operation of the Independent 
Contractors Act 2006 the Owner Driver (Contracts and Disputes) Act 2007, was not 
operational. This Act received exemption from the Independent Contractors Act as of 
1 August 2008.     
 
Federal regulatory systems 
 
Workplace Relations Act 
The Workplace Relations Act 1996 (the Act) has wide application on matters of 
employment in Australia including for employees employed in the freight transport 
industry. The election of a Labor government will have implications for the operation 
and scope of the Act as the government has indicated it will be either amending or 
replacing the Act in line with is pre-election promises. These changes are expected 
over the next 12 – 18 months.  
 
The present Act provides for a number of institutions, mechanisms and principles that 
collectively form the federal institutional framework for industrial affairs. The 
coverage of the Act increased significantly following amendments made by the 
WorkChoices legislation in 2005. Essentially, these amendments to the Act increased 
its scope so that all employees employed by a trading corporation would now be 
covered. These changes affected employees employed in the transport industry.  The 
legislation operates to cover the field, so that employers and employees, who were 
formerly covered by State industrial relations legislation or a state award, but not a 
federal award, are now covered by commonwealth legislation.  This does not mean all 
state industrial instruments are inoperative, but that the status of those instruments has 
changed and the extent to which such provisions will continue to apply is presently 
the subject of the award modernisation process. The exclusion of state and territory 
industrial laws is done under section 16 of the Act.  However, state industrial relations 
schemes continue to operate in situations where employees are employed by non-
trading corporate entities, for example, those employed by sole traders, 
unincorporated partnerships and non-constitutional corporations.     
 
The legislation currently requires certain minimum standards for employees (such as 
leave and holiday conditions, and minimum wage as set by the Fair Pay Commission).  
Rates of pay which may be set out in transport awards or workplace agreements. 
Workplace agreements are a central component of the legislation. Generally, 
workplace agreements outline the conditions and pay rates that apply between a 
specific employer and its employees.  It should be noted in the transport industry the 
majority of employees are not covered by workplace agreements and therefore most 
transport employees rely on the Award conditions.    
 
Transport workers awards  
Across the country various awards, Federal and State (NAPSAs), apply to employees 
in the transport industry. Federal transport awards provide for lower rates of pay and a 
more restricted set of conditions of employment than state awards.  
 
The Transport Workers (Long Distance Drivers) Award 2000 (the Award) is one 
award which regulates some transport employees. The Award covers employees 
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employed as drivers in long-distance operations (defined as involving distances of 
more than 500 km).  
 
The Award was originally made by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
under the auspices of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 made the Award, and was 
preserved subject to notional amendments under the WorkChoices amendments 
(which took effect on 27 March 2006). It has been amended several times and covers 
employers who are a party to the award (listed in a schedule to the Award), employee 
drivers and the Transport Workers Union. The award applies to interstate operations 
within the Commonwealth of Australia and to long distance operations within the 
states of Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria.  
 
A number of terms and conditions of employment that were originally set by the 
Award are now covered by the minimum standards set under the Workplace Relations 
Act 1996, including leave and public holidays. Base rates of pay are separately 
guaranteed under an Australian Pay and Classification Scale derived from the Award, 
and adjusted by the Australian Fair Pay Commission.  
 
The Award retains (among other things) provisions for incentive-based payments and 
allowances, and contains a dedicated dispute resolution mechanism. Relevantly, the 
Award retains two incentive-based pay models (i.e. kilometre and time based rates of 
pay). The general approach underlying the Award is to link the incentive-based pay of 
an employee to the distance travelled.  The rates in the Federal Long Distance Award 
reward distance travelled rather than time spent driving, and consequently have 
effects on employee driver and employer behaviour similar to those observed with 
respect to owner-drivers and those who engage them. Such rates have been deemed 
"incentive" rates and as a result have not been increased since 2005.  
 
No transport award presently extends any obligations or duties to parties other than 
employers in the industry. 
Like other awards, the Award is currently subject to the award modernisation process 
which is being undertaken by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission.  
 
Independent Contractors Act 
The Independent Contractors Act (2006) (ICA) came into operation in July 2007.  
The intention of this Act is to protect from the interference in the genuine independent 
contractual relationships of those parties who have chosen to become independent 
contractors.  
 
The ICA covers ‘service contracts’ which are defined to be a contract that:  
• has independent contractor as a party; and 
• relates to the performance of work by an independent contractor; and 
• has required constitutional connection of one party to the contract being either 
the Commonwealth or a corporation incorporated in Australia. 
 
The ICA overrides existing state legislation; unless where specific exemption has 
been granted. Both the NSW and Victorian owner-driver systems received an 
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exemption from the operation of this Act when it was created, WA applied for and 
received a similar exemption in July 2008.  
 
The ICA gives the Federal Court jurisdiction to review a ‘service contract’ if that 
contract is alleged to be unfair or harsh. In determining whether a contract is unfair or 
harsh, the court may have regard to: 
• the terms of the contract when it was made; 
• the relative bargaining strengths of the parties to the contract; 
• any undue influence or pressure was exerted upon a party to the contract; 
• whether the contract provides total remuneration; and 
• any other matters the court considers relevant. 
 
The ICA gives the Federal Court power to set aside whole or part of a contract, or 
make orders varying that contract.  The Federal Court may only have regards to the 
terms of the contract and the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the 
contract. 
 
 
